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NOTES
DECLARATION OF PRIORITIES OUTSIDE OF RECEIVERSHIP COURTS*
CONFLICTS often arise between a receivership court administering a debtor's
estate and another court claiming power, on the ground of jurisdiction over
person and subject matter, to decide some specific issues incident to a dis-
tribution of the estate. Any suit independent of the receivership court will
usually arise between a claimant of the debtor, as plaintiff, and the debtor's
receiver, who represents all other parties in the receivership litigation. The
issues to be litigated may vary from a declaration of the amount and existence
of a claim to a determination of the status of a claim in relation to other claims
to the debtor's property. One phase of these conflicts is presented when a
court independent of the receivership court' must decide if it is to adjudicate
any one of these issues.2
The first question faced by the independent court is whether it or the
receivership court is to determine the desirability of litigating an issue inde-
pendently. One broad rule which developed in early federal practice made
consent of the receivership court a prerequisite to maintenance of the inde-
pendent suit against the receiver.3 Under this rule, the independent court
had only the formal duty of ascertaining whether consent had been obtained,
the question of the advisability of the suit remaining with the receivership
court.
The universal applicability of this rule is now open to question,'1 however,
in view of several recent decisions. The rule was based on the theory that
an independent suit would directly interfere with the receivership court's
administration of the estate because, it was assumed, jurisdiction to render
judgment necessarily entailed jurisdiction to enforce the judgment.5 But this
*Mills v. Smith, 113 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), cert. denied, 9 U. S. L.
Wr~x 3114.
1. Though this note is addressed to the propriety of adjudicating matters incident
to distribution of a debtor's estate independently of a receivership court, the problems
and considerations determining them can be illustrated from cases where other kinds of
res-distributing courts with purposes and powers similar to a receivership court are
involved.
2. The propriety of an independent trial of any issue may also be raised where a
claimant asks consent of the receivership court to sue the receiver independently [in re
James Butler Grocery Co., 12 F. Supp. 851 (E. D. N. Y. 1935)], or where a claimant
attempts to file a claim in the receivership based on an independent judgment [Riehle
v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 222 (1929)].
3. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126 (1881) ; Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473 (1893).
4. In some jurisdictions, such as Indiana, where the receivership litigation in the
principal case arose, the consent rule still exists. Malott v. State ex rcl. Bd. of Comm'rs,
158 Ind. 678, 64 N. E. 458 (1902). See Note (1934) 91 A. L. R. 996. If Erie R. R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), demands application of the state law, the consent
rule will still control many cases in the federal courts.
5. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126, 128 (1881); Merryweather v. United States,
12 F. (2d) 407, 408 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
assumption has proved false inasmuch as it now appears that independent
courts may render in personam declarations against the receiver in the absence
of power to issue execution on them. 6 Furthermore, consent to make several
types of these independent declarations has become automatic because, re-
ceivership courts have said, they in no way interfere with administration of
the estate.7 In one case where a petitioner had, under the precedents, been
wrongfully denied such permission by a receivership court," a circuit court
of appeals in reversing this holding completely denied the necessity of pro-
curing consent.9 Although the Supreme Court has not gone this far, it has
twice discussed independent determinations of priorities without reference to
consent of the receivership court.10 To the extent that these cases indicate
limitations on the consent rule, independent courts are now faced with the
task of determining the advisability of hearing an independent suit.
In practice, however, any apparent demise of the consent rule may prove
illusory. There is always a threat that the receivership court will decide that
further prosecution of an independent suit would interfere with administra-
tion of the estate. In that case it may enjoin the parties from proceeding,"
an act which would effectively preclude further litigation in the independent
court. A wary plaintiff would, of course, protect himself from this contin-
gency by obtaining consent of the receivership court under all circumstances.
Yet the fact remains that some suits may be brought without first obtaining
permission to sue. And in view of the fact that consent is frequently auto-
matic, it seems overly technical for an independent court to refuse all suits
unless permission has first been obtained. Nevertheless, an independent court
would do well to maintain a cautious attitude toward such suits not only
6. Such a declaration is made against the receiver, as representative of all the
creditors of the debtor not cited into the action, and therefure binds all the parties in
the receivership litigation and precludes any revisory power by the receivership court.
In re Falsone, 247 Fed. 607 (S. D. Fla. 1917); Manhattan Trust Co. v. Chicago Elec.
Traction Co., 188 Fed. 1006 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1910); cf. Bosworth v. St. Louis Terminal
R. R. Ass'n, 174 U. S. 182 (1899) (suit in receivership court). This includes the pur-
chaser of the debtor. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Pere Marquette R. R.,
278 Fed. 832 (E. D. Mich. 1922).
7. Richle v. 'Margolies, 279 U. S. 218 (1929); Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines, 229
U. S. 77 (1936).
8. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corp., 69 F. (2d) 60 (C. C. A.
2d, 1934).
9. Though the issue in this suit was whether consent was essential to sue the debtor,
not the receiver, outside the receivership court, the court held that any independent
suit against the debtor would liquidate a claim for the purposes of participating in re-
ceivership distribution. Id. at 61.
10. United States v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463 (1936) (denied inde-
pendent trial); Wabash R. R. v. Adelbert College, 208 U. S. 38 (1903), relcaring, 203
U. S. 609 (1908).
11. Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93, 112 (1904); 36 STAT. 1162 (1911),
28 U. S. C. § 377 (1934), Bethke v. Grayburg Oil Co., 89 F. (2d) 30, 533 (C. C. A.
5th, 1937); 30 STAT. 546 (1898), 11 U. S. C. §11(15) (Supp. 1939), Steelman v. All
Continent Corp., 301 U. S. 278, 289 (1937) ; 30 STAT. 549 (1898), 11 U. S. C. §29(a)
(1934); 52 STAT. 885 (1938), 11 U. S. C. 516(4) (Supp. 1939).
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because it may expose litigants to an injunction, but also because, even though
the receivership court may be lax in protecting its own authority, the inde-
pendent court may find the receivership forum better equipped to handle the
issue to be tried.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion recently to consider
the advisability of such an independent suit.12 The issue before it was whether
or not to declare a claim against a debtor's estate in a state equity receivership
to be a lien senior to all bondholders' claims. The plaintiff had filed his claim
in the receivership action but had not brought it to a hearing. Without ob-
taining the consent of the state court, he sued the receiver and the trustees
of all bond issues on grounds of diversity of citizenship.13 His claim was
based on a judgment obtained against a federal receiver in a prior action in
the federal court. The debtor in the subsequent state receivership had pur-
chased the property under a decree of foreclosure and sale which, the plaintiff
urged, provided for payment of his judgment. The plaintiff asked the federal
court, in the light of this decree, to dclare his judgment a valid lien on the
debtor's property senior to the claim of all the bondholders and to enforce
it. Though refusing the latter request, the federal court did grant the plaintiff
a declaration that his claim was a senior lien,14 to be enforced by the state
court.
Assuming that the consent rule as laid down by the early federal cases has
no application to the propriety of this exercise of independent power, it may
safely be said that there are no settled rules' 5 determining whether an inde-
pendent court may declare a priority. At one time the Supreme Court10 in
12. Mills v. Smith, 113 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
13. Transcript of Record, p. 2, Mills v. Smith, 113 F. (2d) 404 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
The plaintiff also invoked jurisdiction of the federal court as ancillary to its own earlier
foreclosure decree but was unsuccessful in this plea.
14. Granting of a lien senior to all bondholders was not done explicitly; but since
plaintiff did ask for this declaration, and since the court determined on rehearing that
its judgment was a "valid adjudication against the parties," the decision can be inter-
preted as granting plaintiff a prior lien. Mills v. Smith, 113 F. (2d) 404, at 409 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1940).
15. Specific actions have been permitted independently because, being in persoisam
declarations and not "dealing with the property," they constituted no interference with
the receivership court. Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 224 (1929). This establishes
no general rule that all in personam actions may be tried independently since most issues
in a receivership could be tried independently without reference to the property, leaving
the receivership court with only the ministerial duty of effectuating the independent dec-
larations. This result can be avoided doctrinally by labeling jurisdictionally objectional
actions as in rein. United States v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463, 478
(1936); cf. People's Trust Co. v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 381 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
This provides no general rule in practice, however, since in ren in this context refers to
actions which should be undertaken solely by the receivership court. See Dempsey v.
Pink, 92 F. (2d) 572 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 648 (1938).
16. Opinions in the lower courts are in conflict, though the weight of authority pro-
hibits independent declaration of priorities. Consolidated Music Co. v. Brinkerhoff Piano
Co., 64 F. (2d) 884 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933) ; Mullendore v. American Surety Co., 27 F.
(2d) 572 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928) (consent rule). Contra: Lubbock Hotel Co. v. Guar-
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Wabash R. R. v. Adelbert Collegc 7 decided against an independent declara-
tion of a priority in an estate in receivership in another court. It was pointed
out that a foreclosure and sale would interfere with administration of the
property by the receivership court. Because a declaration of a priority was
a step toward such a sale, the Court assumed that the declaration would also
interfere with administration of the estate. The authority of this part of the
Wabash case was put in doubt, however, by Richle v. Margolies's which
rejected the argument that independent actions should be prohibited solely
because they were steps incident to distribution. The Court stated that inde-
pendent actions were objectionable only if they interfered with the adminis-
tration of the estate by the receivership court.10
The Supreme Court also disapproved of independent declaration of priorities
in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bray,20 a case involving an estate
in bankruptcy. The Court relied strictly on the language of the Bankruptcy
Act in concluding that the bankruptcy court possessed "exclusive jurisdic-
tion" over "proceedings in bankruptcy." 21 But the force of this argument
was weakened by Foust v. Munson S.S. Lincs22 which held that a similar
grant of power to a reorganization court 2 3 was not subject to unqualified use.
The test, it was said, was whether the independent action would actually
"embarrass the administration of the debtor's estate" by the reorganization
court.24 Furthermore, even if the Bray case is controlling in bankruptcy, it
is by no means automatically carried over to receivership where there is no
statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction.2 5 It seems fair to add, however,
that the effectiveness of this last distinction is somewhat lessened by the fact
that the special jurisdiction of a court administering an estate flows more
from its possession of the property than from a particular statutory grant n1
In contrast to these cases which might lend support to an argument against
independent declaration of priorities, the Supreme Court has favored such
declarations in situations somewhat analogous to receivership litigation. There
has been a long standing rule that a federal court may independently declare
anty Bank & Trust Co., 77 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935); cf. Dempsey v. Pink, 92
F. (2d) 572 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) (statutory liquidation).
17. 208 U. S. 38 (1908), on petition for rehearing, 208 U. S. 609 (1903).
18. 279 U. S. 218 (1929).
19. Id. at 224.
20. 225 U. S. 205 (1912).
21. Id. at 216, 217. It referred especially to those sections of the Act enumerating
the bankruptcy courts' powers. 30 STAT. 545 (1S98), 11 U. S. C. § 11 (1934) ; 30 ST.T.
561 (1898), 52 STAT. 867 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 93(k) (Supp. 1939).
22. 299 U. S. 77 (1936).
23. The statutes gave more power to the bankruptcy court than in the Bray case,
specifically granting "exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and his property," BAm:munPcv
AcT § 77B (a), 48 STAT. 912 (1934), and unqualified power to enjoin the action, BAs:-
RuPTcY Acr §77B(c) (10), 48 STAT. 917 (1934).
24. Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines, 299 U. S. 77, 84 (1936).
25. Statutes may, of course, go beyond judicial rules applying to receivership juris-
diction [47 STAT. 1473 (1933), 11 U. S. C. §203(o) (Supp. 1939)], or strengthen them
[Greenberg v. Paramount Pictures, 85 F. (2d) 42, 43 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936)].
26. Warren v. Palmer, 310 U. S. 132 (1940).
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a distributee's share in a decedent's estate - a declaration which necessarily
determines a priority - even though a state probate court is distributing the
corpus of the estate.2 7 This rule existed, however, at a time when independent
federal courts would not make any declaration affecting a receivership pro-
ceeding unless consent had first been obtained by the plaintiff. 28 Furthermore,
there is reason to believe that the rule stems more from the fact that without
such a rule most probate actions would be barred from any federal court 0
than from any consideration per se of the advisability of independent declar-
ations of priorities.3 0
More recently, the Supreme Court has permitted independent declarations
of priorities in two situations where a state court provided a forum to review
disputes between claimants and administrative officers who were actively
distributing debtors' estates.3 ' Both of these declarations differ, however,
from a determination of a priority in a receivership, In the former, the
courts heard claims, approved distributions, and guaranteed the honesty of
the distributing officer whenever a claimant appealed from the officer's action,
In the absence of such an appeal, however, the officer was allowed greater
freedom in formulating a plan and distributing the,property than is a receiver.
A suit which interfered with distribution in these cases, therefore, was more
an interference with the function of the officer than with that of the court.
In view of this difference, the propriety of independently declaring priorities
against officers proves neither that such declarations are not harmful to estate
administration nor that such actions may properly be tried independently
of receivership courts.
3 2
In the most recent case on independent declaration of priorities, the Supreme
Court permitted a railroad reorganization court to declare a lien against
property, title to which was in a second reorganization court.3 3 But this ruling
27. Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33 (1909).
28. Compare Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425 (U. S. 1868) (declaration of distributee's
share permitted) with Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126 (1881) (trial of tort claim
denied).
29. The language of the cases denies probate courts' exclusive jurisdiction oin the
sole ground that a state may not take away by statutes the constitutional right of a
federal trial in diversity cases. Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73, 77 (1885); Payne v.
Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 430 (U. S. 1868).
30. But see Pufahl v. Estate of Parks, 299 U. S. 217, 226 (1936) (probate court
jurisdiction to declare priority of creditor's claim in decedent's estate is exclusive).
31. General Baking Co. v. Harr, 300 U. S. 433 (1937) (statutory liquidating of-
ficer) ; Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Bradford, 297 U. S. 613 (1936) (trustee of a trust
set up under a state court).
32. If General Baking Co. v. Harr, 300 U. S. 433 (1937) can be interpreted as per-
mitting independent declaration of priorities in every case of statutory liquidation by an
administrative officer, however, it is good authority for declaring priorities in a receiver-
ship, since some state liquidating officers are receivers of the court in every respect ex-
cept that they are appointed by the executive. E.g., NEw YORK INSURANcE LAW §§ 40-1,
410, 426; Dempsey v. Pink, 92 F. (2d) 572 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). The General Baking Co.
case was, however, an extremely brief opinion stating only its complete reliance on Coln-
monwealth Trust Co. v. Bradford, 297 U. S. 613 (1936). See note 36 infra.
33. Warren v. Palmer, 310 U. S. 132 (1940).
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was based on a unique situation where the first court was required by statute
to operate a railroad on the property in question. Although "title" was in
the second court, possession was in the first. The declaration of a priority
by the first court is, therefore, more like declaring a priority by a receiver-
ship court than by an independent court. In this light, the case can hardly
be said to establish a general rule permitting independent declaration of
priorities.
In the absence of settled rules on this question of whether priorities should
be declared independently, it is necessary to consider the possible factors
which should provide an answer to the problem. 34 One such factor is the
existence in an independent trial of some advantage which the receivership
could not provide. Special considerations, such as the desirability of granting
a jury trial to determine the amount and existence of a claim35 or of allowing
a local court to decide questions of local land law,30 may demand an inde-
pendent trial.37 A second class of policy considerations, which is independent
of and sometimes conflicts with the first, centers around the effect of an
independent trial on the ability of the receivership court to carry out the
purpose for which it was set up. For example, such independent declarations
as an order to a receiver to account to the independent court and to pay
money to specified persons, 38 or an adjudication inconsistent with a receiver-
ship court's order,39 impair the efficiency of the latter to such an extent that,
34. This problem, of course, may confront not only an independent court but a re-
ceivership court as well where it determines the scope of its exclusive power over estate
distributions.
35. Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines, 299 U. S. 77 (193o); In re Adolph Gobel, Inc.,
89 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
36. Thompson v. 'Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940). The recent atti-
tude of the Court in protecting local government function operates throughout the field
of jurisdictional conflicts arising from reorganizations and liquidation. See (1940) 50
YALE L. J. 165. State railroad commissions are protected against interference by a railrad
reorganization court. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 303 U. S. 79 (1939). Federal courts
must relinquish their jurisdiction over liquidations of local corporations whlien this is
demanded by a state statutory liquidating officer operating pursuant to an adequate pro-
cedure. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935); Comment (1935) 48 -mw.
L. REv. 1400. The sole decision contra to this trend is General Baking Co. v. Harr, 3M0
U. S. 433 (1937). See note 32 supra.
37. There are many other such advantages in an independent trial. See Texas v.
Donoghue, 302 U. S. 284 (1937) (inability of reorganization court to hear a claim) ;
In re Kelley, 297 Fed. 676 (S. D. N. Y. 1923) (inability to cite joint obligees of debtor
into liquidation- proceeding). In certain cases there is statutory provision for independent
jurisdiction concurrent with that of any receivership court. 36 Sr.T. 1104 (1911), 28
U. S. C. § 125 (1934). In other cases statutes may give independent courts exclusive
jurisdiction. The Greyhound, 68 F. (2d) 832 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) (maritime jurisdic-
tion) ; United States v. Illinois Surety Co., 238 Fed. 840 (E. D. N. C. 1917) (right of
materialmen to sue exclusively in federal court on bond running in name of United
States).
38. Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 456 (1939); Lin Bonding & Surety Co.
v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77 (1923) ; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. UIS (1893) (probate).
39. Munroe v. Raphael, 288 U. S. 485 (1933); Oklahoma v. Texas, 2'5 U. S. 49JU
(1924); Rosso v. Freeman, 30 F. (2d) 826 (D. Mass. 1929).
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in the absence of other considerations, the receivership court should have
exclusive control.40 On the other hand, the indifferent effect on the receiver-
ship court's jurisdiction of such independent declarations as the liquidation
of the amount of most claims, 41 or the independent contest of two parties over
the right to one claim, 42 usually avoids an objection to an independent trial. 43
Before applying these considerations, it is necessary to examine the issues
which a court must decide when declaring one claim prior to others, because
the advantages and disadvantages of an independent suit may depend on the
type of issue involved in determining a particular priority. After a court has
determined the amount and existence of a claim, the process of declaring a
priority44 can be broken down into two further operations. The first of these
concerns the particular relation of the claimant to the debtor. The amount
of a claim might be admitted, for example, but further facts might be brought
to show that the debtor was a subsidiary of the claimant and that the claimant
had mismanaged the debtor.45  Or, as in the principal case, interpretation
of an instrument might establish that the claim was a lien. 40  Investigation
of this relationship might be made without going on to the second operation
-that of deciding, in the light of the debtor-creditor relationship, where to
place a claim in relation to all other claims. In the examples above, the
second operation would involve, respectively, determining how to subordinate
the claim in order to penalize mismanagement 47 and determining the seniority
of the lien. In view of these complicating facts, it is obvious that no over-all
conclusion can be made as to the advisability of an independent trial.
40. An independent trial which grossly impairs or totally destroys the possibility of
a fair distribution will be prohibited even in res distributions more subject to independent
determinations than receiverships. Stansbury v. Koss, 10 F. Supp. 477 (S. D. N, Y.
1931) (probate); Allen v. United States, 285 Fed. 678, 684 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923) (statui-
tory liquidation).
41. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatre Corp., 69 F. (2d) 60 (C. C. A. 2d,
1934). But cf. In re Michigan Brewing Co., 24 F. Supp. 430 (W. D. Mich. 1938).
42. Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U. S. 334 (1908); Dixon v. Cleveland, 31 F. Snpp. 1010
(W. D. S. C. 1940).
43. Some independent actions are jurisdictionally sound with reference only to cer-
tain kinds of res actions. Guaranty Trust Co. v. North Chicago, St. R. R., 130 Fed. 801
(C. C. A. 7th, 1904); cf. Hinkley v. Art Students' League, 37 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A.
4th, 1930). In some cases mortgages may even be foreclosed independently though execu-
tion must always be stayed during the res action. Brown v. Crawford, 254 Fed. 146 (D.
Ore. 1918). But cf. International Co. v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 98 F. (2d) 138 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1938).
44. See generally Comment (1940) 49 YALe, L. J. 881.
45. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939) ; see also Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U. S. 295 (1939) (claimant was manager and majority stockholder and held
a confessed judgment against the debtor).
46. The debtor-creditor relationship, as contrasted with its legal effect, may de-
pend in some cases on facts arising solely in a determination of the validity of a clahn.
See, e.g., Bereth v. Sparks, 51 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931); Commonwealth Trust
Co. v. Atwood, 78 F. (2d) 92, 94 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935), aff'd, Commonwealth Trust Co.
v. Bradford, 297 U. S. 613 (1936).
47. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939) (claimant held sub-
ordinate to preferred stockholder).
In general, however, there are few positive advantages to an independent
trial of any of these issues involved in determining a priority.4 s A jury trial,
for example, is rarely needed because facts are infrequently in dispute.
49
On the other hand, there are many instances where no particular disadvantage
exists in liquidating the claim in the independent court. If the debtor-creditor
relation is unconnected with the rest of the receivership litigation or with
the corporate structure of the debtor-e.g., an issue determined by a written
instrument- an independent court is equally as competent as the receiver-
ship court. The receiver in an independent trial must, of course, represent
many creditors of the debtor who are not cited into the action ;-9 but he will
present their causes as adequately as they would personally, since their status
as creditors gives them no special qualification to defend a claim with which
they are unfamiliar and with whicu their own status plays no determining
role.
The equal competence of the receivership and independent courts to deter-
mine these debtor-creditor relations can be contrasted, however, with the
greater ability of a receivership court to compare the status of all claimants
or to determine the debtor-creditor relations arising out of the corporate
structure of a debtor. The determination of these elements of a claim's
priority, depending as they do on the nature of all other claims, can be handled
better by the receivership court. In the first place, the receivership court
can more readily understand the facts at issue because the receivership judge
and the master, who usually passes on each claim before it comes to the
judge,51 hear every claim against the debtor at some time.52 They possess
an understanding of the intricacies of the relationships among the debtor
and all claimants which it would take much unnecessary time and energy of
counsel to present to an independent court. In the second place, the master
and receivership judge are better able to find the facts. Receivership pro-
cedure guarantees a full presentation of the issues more than does the ordinary
practice in an independent court. A correct determination of the position of
one claim in relation to all others is more likely to be made if all contesting
parties are present. In a receivership action this is assured, because every
creditor has the right to object to every other creditor's claim.53 Further-
48. If the federal court in the principal case could have exclusively determined its
own early foreclosure decree, following Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93, at II1
et seq. (1904), this might have compelled independent jurisdiction. See note 13 supra.
49. Such facts may be in dispute in situations intimately bound up with the affairs
of the debtor--e.g., whether there was mismanagement by the parent corporation in
Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939). This will offset the advan-
tages of an independent trial.
50. See note 6 supra. In some instances the receivership court has retried issues on
the grounds that the independent court rendering them was without jurisdiction. Mis-
souri P. Ry. v. Texas P. Ry., 41 Fed. 311 (C. C. E. D. La. 1890) (under consent rule).
Even if this were a correct position, it is immaterial in determining the jurisdiction of an
independent court.
51. See 1 CL.ARic, RcEvac s (2d ed. 1929) § 653.
52. Id. § 646.
53. Davis v. Seneca Falls Mfg. Co., 8 F. (2d) 546 (AV. D. N. Y. 1925) ; Franlin
Nat. Bank v. Whitehead, 149 Ind. 560, 49 N. E. 592 (1893) ; cf. 49 SrTr. 917 (1935),
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more, in most jurisdictions any creditor may appeal from the allowance of a
claim even though the receiver also disputes its allowance. 4 These rights may
become even more effective in the hands of a creditor who represents other
creditors and who is made a party to the original action between the creditor
who brought the receivership action and the debtor.m5 Such a creditor is en-
titled to notice of all proceedings " and the right to object to each action of
the receiver or master as it is made rather than waiting until such officer
makes a final report. 57 Though these rights necessary to a just determination
of a priority might be preserved by citing all creditors into an independent
suit,58 this is usually difficult or even impossible if the creditors reside in
different states.59 It also entails a great expense for the plaintiff and some
expense for all parties, since they must make formal appearances and answers
if they wish to be heard.
Before accepting a case requiring the declaration of a priority, an inde-
pendent court might well stop to consider whether the case involves the
relationship between the claimant and others in the hierarchy of claims, or
a relationship to the debtor which is not readily determined without full
knowledge of the entire business of the debtor. If there is any question
whether either of these is present, the independent court could very well
exercise its discretion and deny jurisdiction, especially in view of a possible
injunction from the receivership court. If neither is present, jurisdiction
could be accepted without impairing the efficiency of receivership adminis-
11 U. S. C. §205(c)(13) (Supp. 1939); 52 STAT. 893, 894 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§596,
606 (Supp. 1939). Such objection may be made to the priority as well as the validity of
claims. Wiggington v. Auburn Wagon Co., 33 F. (2d) 496 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) (judg-
ment creditor) ; cf. Continental Trust Co. v. Toledo St. L. & K. C. R. R., 82 Fed, 642,
647 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1897). Not even the motives of objecting creditors may be
questioned. In re Sully, 152 Fed. 619 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907) (ordinary bankruptcy).
54. Franklin Nat. Bank v. Whitehead, 149 Ind. 560, 49 N. E.'592 (1898) (by impli-
cation). Some courts have held that parties adversely affected by a priority are neces-
sary parties on appeal. Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Rogers Milk Products Co., 16 F. (2d)
271 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926). Contra: Koppel Indust. Car & Equip. Co. v. Lee, 3 F. (2d)
886 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925) (strong dissent, id. at 887); cf. Bosworth v. St. Louis Ter-
minal R. R. Ass'n, 174 U. S. 182 (1899) (intervening claim). An appeal by a creditor
as of right is important since the alternative-asking the court to direct the receiver to
appeal-would allow exercise of lower court discretion. Amick v. Mortgage Security
Corp., 30 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) (no appeal in creditor's own name in ordi-
nary bankruptcy). Contra: In re Roche, 101 Fed. 956 (C. C. A. 5th, 1900).
55. The filing of a claim does not so operate necessarily. Sands v. E. S. Greely &
Co., 80 Fed. 195 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1897).
56. See In re Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 13 F. Supp. 821, 823 (D. Colo. 1936).
Notice may prove illusory where courts will recognize the doctrine that any action taken
in open court is constructive notice. Amick v. Hotz, 101 F. (2d) 311 (C. C. A. 8th,
1939).
57. See Sands v. E. S. Grady & Co., 80 Fed. 195, 198 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1897).
58. United States v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463, 480 (1936) (neces-
sity of citing in all parties rendering independent proceeding not feasible).
59. In a federal court only parties fulfilling the requirements of diversity may be
cited into the action. Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608 (1893).
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tration and probably without fear of injunction. The principal case affords
an example of how this discretion might be exercised. The declaration that
the plaintiff had a lien on the debtor's property involved only an interpre-
tation of a prior court decree. The independent court could do that as well
as the receivership court. But in taking the next step, and apparently declar-
ing the lien prior to all other claims, the court struck at the heart of the
principal task confronting the receivership court. This might better have
been left undetermined.
EFFECT OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION IN SUBSEQUENT
CIVIL SUITS*
CRIINAL and civil proceedings often arise out of the same incident. Where
one of the parties to a civil suit has previously been convicted in a criminal
prosecution involving identical decisive issues, courts have sought to achieve
a balance between two fundamental judicial policies: affording a fair trial to
all, and yet preventing the retrial of litigated fact issues.' One court, ap-
parently proceeding on the theory that a litigant should be allowed only one
day in court, has held the criminal judgment conclusive of the judgment's
essential facts.2 Most courts, however, have ruled the judgment admissible
merely as evidence of the facts ;3 others have refused to admit the criminal
judgment into evidence at all.4
This conflict between theories of judicial administration has been dra-
matically spotlighted by the proceedings which followed the Morro Castle
60. See note 14 supra.
* New York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co. of City of New York,
32 F. Supp. 251 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
1. See 2 FREMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 1318-1324; Von Moscdzisker, Res
Judicata (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 299; Millar, The Premises of Res Judicala in Contincnial
and Anglo-American Law (1940) 39 Mica. L. Rnv. 1, 5.
2. Only one American court has so held. Eagle Star & British Dominions Ins. Co.
v. HeIler, 149 Va. 82, 140 S. E. 314 (1927) ; accord, In re Crippen [1911] P. 10; Thorn-
son, J., dissenting in Commarano v. Gimino, 234 111. App. 556, 563 (1924).
3. Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N. Y. 310, 179 N. E. 711 (1932) ; Everdyke v.
Esley, 258 App. Div. 843, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 666 (4th Dep't 1940) ; Wolff v. Employer's
Fire Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 824, 140 S. W. (2d) 640 (1940); North River Ins. Co. v. Mili-
tello, 104 Colo. 28, 88 P. (2d) 567 (1939), (1938) 10 Rocnvy MT. L. Rmv. 2,M; Sover-
eign Camp W. 0. W. v. Gunn, 227 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491 (1933); (1935) 41 W. VA. L
Q. 396; (1932) 12 B. U. L. REV. 548.
4. Silva v. Silva, 297 Mass. 217, 7 N. E. (2d) 601 (1937); Interstate Dry Goods
Stores v. Williamson, 91 XV. Va. 156, 112 S. E. 301 (1922), (1924) 31 A. L. R. 261;
Girard v. Vermont Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 Ati. 666 (1931); New Yorl:
Life Ins. Co. v. Murdaugh, 94 F. (2d) 104 (C. C. A. 4th, 193S); see Hampton v. West-
over, 137 Neb. 695, 699, 291 N. W. 93 (1940).
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fire. In the most recent phase of that litigation,5 the shipowner prose-
cuted a libel in the District Court for the Southern District of New York
against its insurer to recoup losses sustained in satisfying passengers'
claims arising from the accident. The policy at issue specifically excepted
loss or expense caused by the neglect of the insured or its managing officers.
The court denied the insurer's contention that a previous conviction" of the
libellant and its vice-president, under a statute punishing criminal negligence
resulting in loss of life at sea,7 barred the civil suit. Instead, the court pur-
ported to "give due weight to the verdict of the criminal case as prima facic
evidence" of the defendant's guilt, and then arrived at the opposite conclusion
that the loss did not in fact result from the neglect of libellant or its officers.
If the instant case had been brought in a jurisdiction where a criminal
judgment is inadmissible in a subsequent private suit," the court would have
at least mitigated such a blunt disparagement of the previous verdict by
appearing to ignore it. A jury would then reach its conclusion with no
opportunity of considering the prior conviction. Adherence to the rule of
inadmissibility has, however, led to some unfortunate results.0 Where civil
judgments have been given to convicted insurance beneficiaries or their
privies, there has been a gross violation of the maxim that no one should
profit by his own crime.10 In many cases, furthermore, evidence and wit-
nesses used in the criminal trial are unavailable to the civil litigant, to the
prejudice of the aggrieved party." Or, under the anti-trust laws, particularly
5. New York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 251 (S. D.
N. Y. 1940).
6. New York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v. United States, 89 F. (2d) 23 (C. C. A.
2d, 1937).
7. REv. STAT. §5344 (1878), 33 STAT. 1025 (1905), 35 STAT. 1144 (1909), 18 U. S.
C. §461 (1934).
8. See note 4 supra.
9. See, e.g., Sorbello v. Mangino, 108 N. J. Eq. 292, 155 Atl. 6 (Ch. 1931) (bill to
enjoin husband convicted of murdering his wife from acquiring title to her property);
Rostron v. Rostron, 49 R. I. 292, 142 Atl. 162 (1928) (conviction for desertion; judg-
ment for convicted party in divorce); Chamberlain v. Pierson, 87 Fed. 420 (C. C. A.
4th, 1898) (conviction of those who derailed train inadmissible in damage suit by those
injured); Burke v. Wells Fargo, 34 Cal. 60 (1867); Goodwin v. Continental Casualty
Co., 175 Okla. 469, 53 P. (2d) 241 (1935).
10. Compare Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362 (1902) with Lillie
v. Modern Woodmen of America, 89 Neb. 1, 130 N. W. 1004 (1911); Liverpool & Lon-
don & Globe Ins. Co. v. Wright, 166 Ky. 159, 179 S. W. 49 (1915). See New York Mut-
ual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 600 (1886). The problem of the weight
of the conviction does not arise in insurance cases where a statute or a clause in the
policy prevents recovery by one "convicted" of crime (see Noller v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
142 Kan. 35, 46 P. (2d) 22 (1935); cf. note 32 infra], but only where the statute or
clause voids rights of beneficiaries "guilty" of crime. See also In re Carpenter's Estate,
170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637 (1895) (depriving convicted party of right to inherit from his
victim objected to as attainder). The case is expressly repudiated by statute. PA. STAr.
AxN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 136. See (1934) 44 YALE L. 3. 164, 167, n. 11.
11. See, e.g., Interstate Dry Goods Co. v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E.
301 (1922) (prosecuting witness subsequently convicted for perjury); O'Toole v.
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in view of the length and scope of current litigation in this field, a plaintiff,
injured by one already adjudged guilty of the *related criminal violation,
might fail to sustain his burden of proof solely for want of funds or organized
counsel. 2
Moreover, rationales for strict inadmissibility, other than the desire to
prevent erroneous convictions from influencing ancillary civil actions,': are
quite unconvincing. The differences between civil and criminal rules of
procedure and evidence, though possibly disadvantageous to a criminal de-
fendant in jurisdictions where the accused was not competent to testify in
his own behalf, 14 seem actually to lend greater credence to a convictiun
introduced in a subsequent civil action.15 In order to win a conviction the
prosecution must have proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 16 under
statutes which were, wherever possible, construed in the defendant's favor.'-
On the other hand, the civil plaintiff can win with a mere preponderance of
the evidence. In most jurisdictions the accused in the criminal case could,
without prejudice, have refused to testify; in the civil action discrediting
inferences can be drawn from his silence.1 8 Furthermore, to characterize as
mere hearsay the solemn decision of court and jury upon which the accused
has been fined, imprisoned, or even executed'" is to impair the dignity and
integrity which should be inherent in judicial proceedings.20 There is, of
course, good reason for barring admission of criminal acquittals, which indi-
cate only the prosecution's inability to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.2 ' But conversely to render convictions inadmissible in the name of
O'Toole, 161 L. T. R. (N.s.) 149 (Prob. 1926) (co-respondent, co-defendant in adultery
conviction, had disappeared).
12. But see 38 STAT. 730, 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 16 (1934) ; (1940) 28 Cu.Lw.
L. R.V. 777.
13. See Interstate Dry Goods Co. v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E. 301
(1922).
14. Georgia is apparently the only state retaining this rule. GA. CoDF. ANN:. (Park,
1936) §38-416. See Seaboard A. L. R. R. v. O'Quin, 124 Ga. 357, 52 S. E. 427 (1905)
(this disqualification basis for inadmissibility).
15. See 1 WXIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 4.
16. For historical evaluation of burden of proof, see 9 \VIGUonR, EVIDENCE §§ 2497,
2498.
17. On strict interpretation of Sherman Act indictments, for instance, see United
States v. Patten, 187 Fed. 664 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911), rev'd on other grounds, M26
U. S. 525 (1913) ; Comment (1939) 49 YALE L. J. 284, 287.
18. See 8 WXIGaORE, EVIDENCE § 2272; Comment (1940) 49 Yearn L. J. 1059, 1061.
19. See Hinton, Judgment of Conviction-Effect in Civil Case as Res Judicala or as
Evidence (1927) 27 ILL. L. Rav. 195, 198; 5 WXiGMoE, EVIDENCE §1671a. The hearsay
rule is satisfied by the fact that the accused faced and cross-examined the witnesses b2-
fore him. (1927) 41 Hamv. L. R.v. 241, 244.
20. See BowER, Ras JuDiCATA (1924) 140.
21. Hampton v. Westover, 137 Neb. 695, 291 N. WV. 93 (1940); Gates, Supt of
Banking, v. Carter, 225 Iowa 893, 281 N. W. 727 (1938); see Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.
S. 291, 302 (1914). For the same reason civil judgments are inadmissible in subsequent
criminal actions. United States v. Satuloff Bros., 79 F. (2d) 846, 848 (C. C. A. 2d,
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mutuality 22 disregards the high probative value of a jury's deliberate verdict
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.2
In other jurisdictions courts have relaxed the strict rule to admit criminal
convictions as some,; or as prima facie, evidence of their essential facts. 24
But the admissibility rule may appear at best to be a compromise which does
not completely satisfy any policy consideration. Weighing a previous con-
viction as evidence is an even more delicate problem for a jury than that posed
by the ordinary presumption.2 5 If the prior judgment overawes the court
or jury, suppressing a genuine belief that the conviction was error, the
privilege of rebuttal would be rendered nugatory and the chief purpose of
the presumption defeated. Yet if the conviction is considered as merely some
evidence of guilt, the fact that it is a formal judgment reached upon deliberate
consideration may be underestimated. Furthermore, if the "bursting bubble"
theory of presumptions prevails, the conviction does not appreciably relieve
the burden of the party invoking it.26 In actual practice the rule has not
prevented convicted criminals from profiting by their adjudged crime, and
obtaining civil judgments that they were, in effect, not guilty.27 And it is
to be seriously questioned whether a person who has had one trial, with the
privilege of facing and cross-examining the witnesses against him, as well as
the right to appeal an adverse judgment, should be allowed to attack that
1935). Contra: Qualtop Beverages, Inc. v. MacCampbell, 22 F. (2d) 417 (W. D. N. Y.
1927) ; St. Louis v. Cain, 137 S. W. (2d) 603 (Mo. 1940).
22. That the form-identity of parties and issues-overshadowed the substance of
policy in criminal-civil litigation is well illustrated by the cases where the state is both
prosecutor and party to the civil action. Even when it was conceded that civil action by
the state after criminal acquittals did not constitute double jeopardy, it was often held
that, since the first trial involved identical parties and issues, the civil action was barred
as estoppel by judgment. Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 427 (1885); Hanby v.
Comm'r of Int. Rev., 67 F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933). The practical possibility that
the prosecutor, unable to prove criminal guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, might yet con-
vince a jury of the defendant's civil liability was disregarded. Logically, therefore, failure
to prove intent would foreclose the civil sanctions to abate a nuisance or collect a tax
deficiency or penalty. But see Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178 (1896). Fortunately
the federal courts have since acknowledged that the totality of res judicata is not iden-
tity of parties. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938) ; United States v. One
Dodge Sedan, 113 F. (2d) 552 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940); ed. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940); George H. Lee Co. v. F. T. C., 113 F. (2d) 583 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1940).
23. See Chafee, Progress of the Law, 1921-1922-Evidence (1922) 35 HAv. L. PR.sv.
428, 440.
24. See cases cited supra note 3. The Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730, 731 (1914), 15 U.
S. C. § 16 (1934), made convictions and civil judgments for the government in anti-trust
actions privia facie evidence of civil liability to the injured party.
25. Hinton, supra note 19, at 197; 9 WIGmoRE, EVIDENcE §§ 2491, 2492.
26. See 9 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2491; Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Pre-
sumnptions (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 906, 912, 913.
27. See, for example, Wolff v. Employer's Fire Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 824, 140 S. W.
(2d) 640, 643 (1940); Cammarano v. Gimino, 234 II1. App. 556 (1924); New York &
Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 251 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Ram-
sey v. Associated Bill Posters, 271 Fed. 140 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
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judgment collaterally merely because he faces another adversary.29 The
spectacle of the court in the instant case openly repudiating a previous verdict
and judgment of conviction by the same court on tfe identical facts at issue
is eloquent testimony to the inefficacy of both the admissibility and the in-
admissibility rules.
But for the shibboleth of the identity of parties and mutuality theory.
which forbids anyone from invoking as conclusive a judgment to which he
was not a party,2 9 several courts, moved by these considerations, might have
held a criminal judgment conclusive of its decisive facts and a bar to action
by the convicted party based on a denial of them.3 0 But only one American
court has so held.31 In some jurisdictions, however, the identity-mutuality
concept, though retained, has been honeycombed with exceptions. Even
courts where criminal judgments were inadmissible as evidence of the facts
upon which they were based have held judgments conclusive of the fact
of their rendition.32 For instance, in false imprisonmentas and malicious
prosecution 3 4 cases, the plaintiff's previous conviction has barred a civil
action. Furthermore, the notion of privity has occasionally been stretched
to avoid the requirement of identity of parties. Thus, a civil plaintiff who
has appeared as prosecuting witness in the criminal trial has sometimes been
deemed in privity with the prosecutor.33 Some courts have categorized con-
victions such as trespass on property as judgments in rem and thus conclusive
in subsequent actions.3 6 Still others have considered convictions for adultery
28. See cases cited infra note 42.
29. See note 22 supra.
30. See Wolff v. Employer's Fire Ins. Co., 292 Ky. 824, 140 S. W. (2d) 40, 644
(1940); Cammarano v. Gimino, 234 I1. App. 556 (1924); ef. Burt v. Union Ins. Co.,
187 U. S. 362 (1902) (court declined to attack the mutuality doctrine, but achieved sme
result by peculiar construction of insurance contract).
31. Eagle Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 141 S. E. 133
(1928).
32. Diamond v. New York Life Ins. Co., 50 F. (2d) 84 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) ; In re
Needham, 364 Ill. 65, 4 N. E. (2d) 19 (1936) (conviction thus conclusive in disbar-
ment).
33. Erie R. R. v. Reigherd, 166 Fed. 247 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909); see McLean v. San-
ders, 143 Ore. 524, 23 P. (2d) 321 (1933) ; cf. Turgeon v. Dean, 109 Me. 189, 83 At. 557
(1912) (acquittal conclusive).
34. See Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Edwards, 281 Ky. 693, 137 S. W. (2d) 344
(1940); Ryan v. Conover, 59 Ohio App. 361, 18 N. E. (2d) 277 (193); Crescent City
Live Stock Co. v. Butcher's Union, 120 U. S. 141 (1887).
35. Stone v. Winn, 165 Ky. 9, 176 S. W. 933 (1915) ; Maybe v. Avery, 18 Johns
352 (N. Y. 1820); Shiebley v. Fales, 81 Neb. 795, 116 N. W. 1035 (190S) (taxpayer
in privity with county to allow to invoke judgment for county as conclusive). But .vhere
prosecutor in criminal case was hired by civil plaintiffs, effect of identity requirement
was not avoided. Kusnir v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 201 Fed. 146 (S. D. N. Y. 1912).
See also National Mut. Co. v. Sontag Chain Stores Co., 107 F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A. 9th,
1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 645 (1940).
36. New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U. S. 656 (1875).
But see Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246 (U. S. 1818). Cf. \NVilliams v. Prather, 196 So.
118 (Ala. 1940).
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or bastardy as declarations of status conclusive in subsequent divorce pro-
ceedings or actions for support-st
But doctrinal consistency requires a frank redefinition of the identity-of-
parties-mutuality concept. The notion, apparently derived from rules adopted
for contracts and property which hold one bound by a judgment against his
predecessor in title only if his predecessor could have taken advantage of a
contrary decision,38 is traditionally justified as a protection against the taking
of property without trial.39 Insofar as the rule prevents a winning litigant
from invoking his favorable judgment or his acquittal against one not a party
to the prior action, it operates to guarantee due process.40 But if a previous
adverse judgment is held conclusive against the losing party, there is no
taking of property from one who has not been afforded a trial on the grounds
for the judgment.41 Thus the New York courts have concluded that the
"one day in court principle" would be best served by restricting the identity-
of-parties-mutuality rule so that a losing party in a civil suit is bound by
the decision of the issues in subsequent actions against one not a party to
the original case.42
Practical objection to making previous civil judgments thus conclusive is
the possibility that, since liability from an adverse judgment might transcend
the immediate controversy, compromise would be discouraged and every
litigant forced to fight his case to the utmost.43 This objection does not
necessarily militate against a rule making criminal judgments similarly con-
clusive. In view of the questionable reputation of compromised prosecu-
tions, 44 it is, first of all, debatable whether public policy demands their
37. Wald v. Wald, 161 Md. 493, 159 Atl. 97 (1931); Anderson v. Anderson, 4 Me.
100 (1826); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 160 Mass. 165, 35 N. E. 773 (1893). It has been
suggested that admitting criminal convictions in divorce proceedings does no violence to
the identity of parties requirement because the state is constructively a party to the sec-
ond action. 2 BisHoP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (6th ed. 1881) § 638.
38. See Comment (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 607, 609.
39. Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 538 (1776) ; Von Moschzisker,
Res Judicata (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 299, 303; cf. Cox, Res Judicata: Who Is Entitled
to Plead (1926) 9 VA. L. REG. (N.s.) 241, 253.
40. See p. 501 supra.
41. See Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 Atl. 260 (1934). Compare
Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 299, 300, 303, with Comment
(1926) 35 YALE L. J. 607, 608.
42. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. George Colon & Co., 260 N. Y. 305, 183 N. E. 506
(1932); Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N. Y. 14, 9 N. E. (2d) 758
(1937); accord, Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 At. 260 (1934) ; cf.
Mortimer v. Natapaw, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 971 (Roch. City Ct. 1940). Many courts hold
master and servant, principal and agent "in privity" for purposes of estoppel. See, e.g.,
Leary v. Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 215 N. C. 501, 2 S. E. (2d) 570
(1939); Blue Valley'Creamery Co. v. Cronimus, 270 Ky. 496, 110 S. AV. (2d) 286
(1937).
43. Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 299, 303.
44. See WICKERSHAM CoMMIssIoN, REPORT ON PROSECUTION (1931) 18-20; Miller,
The Compromise of Criminal Cases (1927) 1 So. CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2.
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encouragement.45 On the other hand, if compromise is deemed expedient, 43
a rule of conclusiveness can be molded accordingly.
Popular procedure for compromising prosecutions is a plea of guilty by
the accused in consideration for light punishment. Thus a plea of guilty,
ostensibly more convincing proof of guilt than a conviction after trial, may
often be made by one who is able to obtain acquittal but is induced by ex-
trinsic circumstances to capitulate.47 To make a conviction after a plea of
guilty conclusive might, therefore, seriously deter compromise. In most
jurisdictions, however, a more precise and systematic procedure for those
seeking to compromise indictments is a plea of volo con tendcre49 WNhereas
a plea of guilty could be introduced as an admission in subsequent civil
actions, even in jurisdictions where previous convictions are inadmissible, 9
a plea of nolo in which the pleader neither confesses nor denies his guilt
has been distinguished by inadmissibility in a subsequent suit. 0 By trans-
posing this distinction into a rule of conclusiveness, a conviction based on a
plea of guilty could be deemed an unambiguous confession of guilt, equally
as binding as a litigated conviction. Nolo would remain available to those
who would compromise the criminal prosecution except for the attendant
possibility of civil liability.15
In some states, including New York, however, volo contendere is not
recognized,5 2 so that pleas of guilty are widely utilized for compromise.-m
45. See WIcKERSHAM Comuissox, op. cit. stPra note 44, at 93; Miller, supra note
44, at 27.
46. See Comment (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 107, 110.
47. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE CRmE CoMMssION (1927) 129-132; FuLuEn,
CRIMINAL JUsTIcE IN VIRGIMA (1931) 85; CmmiNAL JUsTICE IN CtL.ELAD (19"3)
236; Msssotni CRIME SURVEY (1926) 276.
48. See Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451 (1926), (1927) 36 YA.E L. J. 421;
United States v. Tucker, 196 Fed. 260 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912) ; State v. La Rose, 71 X. H.
435, 52 At. 943 (1902); Teslovich v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 110 Pa. Super. 245, 163
AtI. 354 (1933); Dillon v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
49. Dzura v. Phillips, 275 Mass. 283, 175 N. E. 629 (1931); Globe & Rutgers Fire
Ins. Co. v. Foil, 189 S. C. 91, 200 S. E. 97 (1938).
50. Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451 (1926), (1927) 36 YALE L J. 421.
51. Most popular field for pleas of nolo contendere has been in Sherman Act prose-
cutions. See Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 336 (D. Minn. 1939);
Barnsdall Ref. Corp. v. Birnanwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 303 (E. D. Wis. 1940), 2.3
CALIF. L. REv. 777; HADLiCK, CRimixAL PRosEctrno.s uanE THlE SHER,;,. ACr
(1939) 131.
52. People v. Daiboch, 265 N. Y. 125, 191 N. E. 859 (1934); Mahoney v. State, 197
Ind. 335, 149 N. E. 444 (1925) ; State v. Kiewel, 166 Minn. 302, 207 N. W. 66 (1926).
Nolo is also not available in felony cases in many jurisdictions. Roach v. Commonwealth,
157 Va. 954, 162 S. E. 50 (1932); cf. Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451 (192w1.
In these jurisdictions there could be no objection to making pleas of guilty to felonies
admissible subject to explanation, and pleas of guilty to misdemeanors (where nolo is
available) conclusive.
53. See note 47 supra. Note New York provision for a compromise of misdemeanors
such as assault and battery whereby the state prosecution is terminated upon settlement
With injured party. GmBEvR, NEW Yoan CaniNAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1940) § 663.
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In the absence of the more accurate pleading device, it would seem advisable
to exempt convictions based on pleas of guilty from the rule of conclusive-
ness, and to render them admissible subject to explanation in a subsequent
civil trial. 4 Rather than stifle compromise, the rule of conclusiveness, with
this exception, would actually encourage it. Also an exception should prob-
ably be made for criminal convictions in inferior tribunals such as justice
of the peace or traffic courts, where possible civil liability dwarfs the criminal
penalty, and the accused, generally unrepresented by counsel, may not realize
upon his opportunity to plead nolo contendere.rr
Otherwise it would seem that, in line with the accepted policy of fore-
closing relitigation of established facts, an excellent argument can be made,
without deterring compromise, for holding criminal convictions conclusive
of decided issuesY6 In New York, consistency would require that, since in
civil suits an adverse judgment is conclusive against the losing party on
any subsequent suit on the issues, a like conclusiveness should be granted
criminal judgments. The objections to such an approach are, of course, not
completely answerable. Those who would give only prima facie weight to
prior criminal judgments can marshal substantial arguments. It is generally
recognized that a finding of negligence is largely the effect on a particular
tribunal of a particular set of facts. And in a suit on a contract -as in the
instant case -other considerations, such as the intention of the parties, may
well vitiate the applicability of the prior conviction. To establish arbitrary con-
clusiveness for criminal convictions could conceivably result in an undesir-
able paralysis of the court in the civil case, where the decided issues are
viewed in a different frame of reference, compelling a result contrary to that
which should have been reached on the facts presented.
54. Cf. cases cited supra note 49.
55. In Connecticut, for example, all convictions are admissible except those in a
traffic court. Page v. Phelps, 108 Conn. 572, 143 Atil. 890 (1928) (litigated conviction) ,
Zenuk v. Johnson, 114 Conn. 383, 158 Atl. 910 (1932) (plea of guilty to violation of
rules of road) ; cf. Olk v. Marquardt, 203 Wis. 479, 234 N. W. 723 (1931).
In civil actions, while judgments of inferior courts generally operate as estoppel
equally with judgments of courts of record, the former are more vulnerable to collateral
attack. Compare Little v. Blue Goose Motor Coach Co., 251 I1. App. 382 (1929) with
Ex parte Swehla, 114 Kan. 712, 220 Pac. 299 (1923). See 1 MooRzE, Fr.DERAL PRArlc
(1938) 148.
56. Courts have refused to enjoin enforcement of criminal judgments on the ground
of extrinsic fraud. People v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. 624, 213 Pac. 945 (1923) ; Chli-
cago R. I. & P. v. Callicotte, 267 Fed. 799 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920). But in subsequent
civil actions courts can refuse to enforce otherwise conclusive criminal judgments where
the conviction was based on extrinsic fraud and the innocence of the accused generally
recognized. On the frequency of such a situation, see BORCHARD, CONVICTING TUBS INNO-
CENT (1932).
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NLRB USE OF BACK PAY ORDER TO REIMBURSE WORK
RELIEF AGENCIES*
THE National Labor Relations Act, admirably clear in its enumeration of
specific unfair labor practices, is palpably vague in defining the means to
be used for enforcing its substantive provisions. Section 10(c) empowers
the National Labor Relations Board, upon a finding of an unfair labor
practice, to order the respondent to cease and desist and "to take such
affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back
pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act." 1 The Supreme Court has
said that this affirmative power "does not go so far as to confer a punitive
jurisdiction enabling the Board to inflict upon the employer any penalty it
may choose because he is engaged in an unfair labor practice, even though
the Board is of the opinion that the policies of the Act might be effectuated
by such an order."2 This limitation on the enforcing power of the Board
is itself in need of more precise definition; the Board, confronted with a
specific case, is ill-equipped to render a satisfactory decision if it has only
the twin terms, "punitive" and "remedial," to guide its judgment. 3
In the much-publicized Republic Steel case,4 the Supreme Court had occa-
sion to circumscribe further the bounds within which the Board's affirmative
orders must operate. Having found that the Republic Steel Corporation had
committed certain unfair labor practices, the Board ordered the reinstatement
with back pay of the unlawfully discharged employees. In addition, the
company was directed to deduct from the payments to the reinstated employees
the amounts they had received from work relief projects and to pay over such
amounts to the appropriate governmental agencies.5 Speaking for a majority
of six, Mr. Chief justice Hughes denied the Board's contention that it had
the power to determine that the chief function of these agencies was to pro-
vide relief and that the government should not be made to bear the burden
* Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 61 Sup. Ct. 77 (U. S. 1940).
1. 49 STAT. 454 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160(c) (Supp. 1938).
Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 235-236 (1938).
3. It has become common for courts to divide the Board's affirmative orders into
"punitive" and remedial" categories. See, in addition to the Consolidated Edison case,
N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 267, 268 (1937); Black Dia-
mond S. S. Corp. s. N. L. R. B., 94 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied, 304
U. S. 579 (1938); N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A. 2d,
1938), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 576 (1938), reh'9 denied, 304 U. S. 590 (1933). The mi-
nority said in the principal case, 61 Sup. Ct. 77, at 81, that the back pay order is "clear
and unambiguous," a statement unjustified by the controversy surrounding the clause and
by the majority result.
4. Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 61 Sup. Ct. 77 (U. S. 1940).
5. Aside from the provision which ordered reimbursement of the work reliei pro-
jects, this was a typical Board order. The company was directed to cease and desist
from the practices found to be unfair, to withdraw recognition from a labor organization
found to be company-dominated, and to reinstate with back pay those employees found
to have been discriminatorily discharged. In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 N. L. R. B. 219,
400404, aff'd except for an unimportant modification sub nora. Republic Steel Corp. v.
N. L. R. B., 107 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
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of Republic's unfair labor practices.0 There was no finding, said the Chief
Justice, that the agencies, and through them the public, did not receive "the
benefit of services reasonably worth the amounts paid." The Court indicated,
however, that even absence of value received would not entitle a relief agency
to reimbursement. 7 In seeking thus to redress an injury not to the employees
but to the public, the Court held, the Board's order was in the nature of
a penalty, and hence beyond the scope of the affirmative power granted by
Section 10(c). Moreover, this majority view, in the opinion of the minority,
signifies that the Board may not require full back pay even to unlawfully
discharged employees who have received governmental relief benefits or private
wages.8 Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, while willing to agree
that the literal wording of the statute barred recoupment by relief agencies,
dissented from the majority's view that award of full back pay, whether
wholly to employees or partly to relief agencies, was necessarily punitive.
The order served to promote the purposes of the Act, they said, since an
employer might be discouraged from committing unfair labor practices by his
knowledge that he cannot shift to government relief agencies part of the
burden of supporting wrongfully discharged employees.0 The minority said
6. Mr. Justice Roberts did not participate. The Chief Justice's opinion agreed with
that of four Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Board was denied the power to order reim-
bursement of governmental relief agencies in the Circuit Courts of Appeals of the First,
Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits. N. L. R. B. v. Waumbec Mills, Inc., 114 F. (2d)
226 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); N. L. R. B. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 111 F. (2d) 619 (C. C. A.
2d, 1940); Phelps Dodge Cdrp. v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940);
Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 114 F. (2d) 849 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); New
York Handkerchief Co. v. N. L. R. B., 114 F. (2d) 144 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); M. 1-1.
Ritzwoller Co. v. N. L. R. B., 114 F. (2d) 432 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); N. L. R. B. v.
Tovrea Packing Co., 111 F. (2d) 626 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940). The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals alone has sustained such an order. Union Drawn Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., 109 F.
(2d) 587 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940); Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F. (2d) 472 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1939). See also (1939) 53 HAv. L. Rav. 141.
7. Also barred from reimbursement would be agencies which supply strike benefits
or job insurance payments. See In re Missouri-Ark. Coach Lines, Inc., 7 NLRB 186
(1938) ; In re Stove Bedding Co., 15 NLRB 635 (1939).
8. It should be noted, however, that the minority's view of the significance of the
majority's ruling derives little, if any, support from the express words of the majority.
It may be that in cases where charity has been extended to the discharged employee the
latter might still be awarded full back pay. See In re Vegetable Oil Prod. Co., 5 NLRB
52 (1938), azend'g 1 NLRB 989 (1936).
9. The dissenting justices said that the words "reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay" might fairly be interpreted to mean that the employees must them-
selves be the recipients of back pay. To such an interpretation they would have acqui-
esced. But they could not concur in the holding that "the Board may not require full
back pay, even to a wrongfully discharged employee, if he has received pay for services
performed on a governmental relief project . . ." Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B.,
61 Sup. Ct. 77, 80 (U. S. 1940).
Basically this is the position argued by the Board, which, however, sought to avoid
unjust enrichment of the employee. "In form the Board's order requires petitioner to
reimburse the agencies. But in substance the order may as readily be viewed as determin-
ing that petitioner shall reimburse the employees for back pay lost, but that the employees,
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also that the Board could in no instance award any greater sum than back
pay for the period of the employee's unlawful discharge. The limitation which
they thus sought to impose upon the Board's discretion would have to meet
the argument that the power to take appropriate affirmative action is broader,
and might produce awards exceeding back pay, unless restricted to "remedial"
action.
The issue presented by the division in the Court demands analysis of the
back pay order's function as a means of effectuating the policies of the Act.1°
If it looks equally to the employee and to the employer, restoring the one
and deterring the other, then an order whose effect is to deter the employer
may be valid. But if its fundamental purpose is to restore employees unlaw-
fully discharged, the deterring effect on the employer is not enough to bring
it within the scope of the power delegated; nor, if its purpose is to redress
an injury to the employees, can it matter whether the work relief agencies
received a value equal to what they paid the employees.
Among the enforcing provisions of the Act, the back pay order alone has
the effect of deterring an employer from committing an unfair labor practice.
Except for the unimportant provision of Section 12, there are no criminal
penalties in the Act.1  The Board's specifically authorized powers to issue
cease and desist orders and to reinstate employees are operative only after
the unfair labor practice has been committed. The same is true of orders
issued by the Board under its broad power "to take such affirmative action
. . . as will effectuate the policies of this Act." When, for example, an
employer is directed to disestablish a union found to be company-dominated, 12
or to recognize a duly chosen bargaining representative of his employees,13
the order results from a finding that an unfair labor practice has been com-
mitted. The purposes of such an order are several: (1) to restore the em-
ployees to the position in which they would have been, had there been no
in turn, shall reimburse the governments for interim support. In this view it is but a
bookkeeping convenience for petitioner to pay the governments directly." Brief for Re-
spondent, pp. 27-28, Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 61 Sup. Ct. 77 (U. S. 1940).
10. For a discussion of the decisions rendered in connection with the back pay order,
see (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1265.
11. Section 12 of the Act provides for criminal penalties for wilful interference with
members of the Board in the performance of their duties. "Specifically, the act passes
over criminal sanctions and adopts the procedures of administrative law as developed in
the Federal Trade Commission Act." REPoRT oF NLRB To Coam. oxi LA~oP oz H. R.
2761, 4376, 4400, 4594, 4990, and 5331, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 2.
12. It is a violation of § 8(2) for an employer to dominate a labor organization. The
Board's power to order a company-dominated union disestablished was upheld in N. L.
R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261 (1938). For other cases in which
the Board ordered a union disestablished, see NLRB 1st ANN. Rm. (1936) 127-123;
NLRB 2d Axx. REP. (1937) 147-148; NLRB 3d Axr. REp. (1938) 197-199; NLRB
4th ANN. RnP. (1939) 98. See also Comment (1938) 26 CAir. L. Rnv. 611; (1937) 51
HARv. L. REv. 358.
13. It is a violation of § 8(5) for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with
.the representatives of his employees. For cases involving this provision see NLRB Ist
ANt. REP. (1936) 84-92; NLRB 2d A-,.N. REp. (1937) 79-83; NLRB 3d A.;. REP.
(1938) 90-108; NLRB 4th AwN. REP. (1939) 64-68.
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violation of the act; (2) to protect the rights of employees from further
violations of the act. Together these purposes fulfill a third important func-
tion: to inculcate in the employees confidence sufficient to enable them to
exercise freely their right of collective bargaining.
In this concept of the Act the back pay order performs an indispensable
service. It is necessary to redress the injury previously done the employees,
and it is necessary to assure them of proper protection if they exercise their
enumerated rights. In so serving, the back pay order also discourages an
employer from a first violation of the Act; but there is nothing in the statute
itself, or in any previous interpretation of it by the Board or the courts,
which would indicate that the deterrent qualities of an order are per se
reason enough for its existence. 14 Use of the back pay order as a deterrent,
moreover, would be anomalous since its possible effect is limited to a single
unfair labor practice - discrimination in regard to tenure of employment to
discourage union membership.' 5 The Board's recognition of the non-deterrent
function of the back pay order is suggested by its constant setting of an
employer's liability at an amount exactly equal to the injury suffered by his
employee. Thus, the Board deducts from the back pay award whatever the
employee earned in private employment during the period of unlawful dis-
charge, 6 making an exception, however, for "extra-curricular" work.11 More-
over, it has been held that there is a duty upon the employee to seek work
elsewhere during his period of idleness and by so doing to mitigate damages.18
But the employer is required to reimburse the employee for expenses incurred
while looking for a new job.' 9 And an employer found to have moved his
place of business in order to escape the employee's union must pay the travel-
ing expenses of the employee and his family.20
From the viewpoint of deterring the employer alone, it can make little
or no difference whether an employee secures temporary work with a private
14. A few courts, however, have said that the purpose of the back pay provision "is
not to reward the employees, although it may have that effect, but is to serve in a meas-
ure as a punishment so that employers are less likely to engage in unfair labor practices.
N. L. R. B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533, 538 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), cert. denied,
304 U. S. 575 (1938), 306 U. S. 646 (1939) ; N. L. R. B. v. American Potash & Chem.
Corp., 113 F. (2d) 232, 235 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
15. Section 8(3). The rarely used § 8(4), prohibiting discharge against an employee
who has filed charges or given testimony under the Act, is another possibility.
16. See In re National Casket Co., Inc., 1 NLRB 963 (1936); In re Hardwick
Stove Co., Inc., 2 NLRB 78 (1936); In re The Associated Press, I NLRB 788 (1936).
This result is now apparently compelled by -the Supreme Court's decision in the instant
case.
17. See In re National Motor Bearing Co., 5 NLRB 409 (1938) ; In re Anwelt Shoe
Co., 1 NLRB 939 (1936); In re Pusey, Maynes & Breish Co., 1 NLRB 482 (1936).
18. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); In re
Western Felt Works, 10 NLRB 407 (1938).
19. See it re Crossett Lumber Co., 8 NLRB 440 (1938); In re Crescent Bed Co.,
Inc., 9 NLRB 433 (1938).
20. See In re S. & K. Knee Pants Co., Inc., 2 NLRB 940 (1937); In rc Robinson
& Golluber, 2 NLRB 460 (1936).
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employer or with the WPA.2 1 Likewise, the threat of disciplinary action by
the Board would serve the same purpose- and perhaps more efficiently.
Indeed, it is the very absence of sanctions comparable to those vested in many
administrative boards which best indicates that Congress did not intend the
back pay order primarily to prevent unfair labor practices. 22 Furthermore,
the deterrent effects inherent in the back pay order remain. An employer
will be hardly less discouraged from violating the Act by the knowledge that
his liability will be reduced by an amount equal to what was earned by his
employee from the WPA. In the first place, he can have no assurance that
the employee will be able to secure work relief; in the second place, the larger
portion of his liability remains- i.e., the difference between his wage scale
and that of the relief project, in addition to the considerable expense of
litigation.
It can be argued that an interpretation of the Act which limits the Board
to preventing only a second violation is grossly inefficient as a means of
ending unfair labor practices ;23 and it would be difficult to dispute this, in
view of the enormous number of violations since the passage of the Act.2 4
But it was to be anticipated that violations would be frequent while employers
-inheritors of a tradition which permitted the discharge of employees for
any reason or for no reason at all- were becoming accustomed to rights
newly vested in their employees and to correlative duties newly imposed
upon them.2 5 It is to be hoped that when employers become reconciled to
the NLRA, the Board will be empowered to mediate in labor disputes, instead
of being permitted only to redress an injury already done.
One aspect of the Chief Justice's opinion is in need of clarification. The
statement that an order is in the nature of a penalty if it is viewed as redress-
ing an injury, not to the employee, but to the public might be interpreted
to indicate that the right involved is a private one resting in the employee.
If the nature of the right is a private one, then courts would be justified
in allowing damage done by striking employees to be set off against the
amount due for back pay,206 or in making injured employees stand as common
21. The only conceivable difference it could make is that work with WPA would be
more easily obtainable and that its wage scale would probably be lower.
22. The Securities Exchange Act, for example, allows the Commission to suspend
or expel from the national stock exchanges any individual who has violated the provi-
sions of the act. 48 STAT. 898, 15 U. S. C. § 78s(a) (3) (1934). There are many instances
where Congress has conferred upon administrative agencies the power to revoke licenses.
See, e.g.. Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 StAT. 159 (1921), 7 U. S. C. § 181 (1934);
Grain Futures Act, 42 STAT. 1517 (1923), 7 U. S. C. §51 (1934). The statutes all pro-
vide for criminal penalties as well.
23. Feller, Prospectits For Tlw Further Study of Admhinnstrathc Lat (1939) 47
YALE L. J. 647, 672.
24. In five years the Board has published twenty-five volumes of cases argued before
it. This represents approximately only 6% of the total number of suits actually begun
against employers for violations of the act. REPKRT OF NLRB To Con.. o. LAr!n o.-
H. R. 2761, 4376, 4400, 4594, 4990, and 5331, 76th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1t39) 3.
25. See Shulman, Book Review (1938) 51 HaRv. L. REv. 1121.
26. In re Republic Steel Corp.. 9 NLRB 219, 399 (1938).
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creditors where the employer became bankrupt after he had committed an
unfair labor practice,2 7 or in denying a right of action against a partnership
one of whose members had died after the employees had been wrongfully
discharged.2 8 To hold that the right was a private one resting in the em-
ployee would be unfortunate in view of the asserted public purpose of the
Act,29 of the fact that the Board as well as the employee may seek enforce-
ment of any order,3 0 and of the facts that an employee cannot compel the
Board to issue a complaint 3 ' or to require back pay, The public, as well
as the employee, has urgent interests at stake in ending unfair labor practices.
TAXABILITY OF BENEFICIARY-ASSIGNOR ON ASSIGNMENTS
OF TRUST INCOME*
WHEN it is desirable to effect substantial tax savings by apportioning large
incomes over several taxable units,' potentially large taxpayers generally
make this allocation by deflecting parts of their incomes to other members
of the family. Such taxpayers may, of course, reduce surtaxes by the simple
expedient of giving away part of their income-producing property to their
children.2 Most individuals, however, reluctant to surrender complete owner-
ship in order to avoid the tax, arrange for payment to members of their
families while at the same time retaining valuable rights in the property.
To date, Government efforts to prevent tax reduction by such intrafamily
27. In Hamilton Brown Shoe Co. v. N. L. R. B., 104 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 8th,
1939) the court so held. For a criticism of this result see (1940) 40 CoL. L. REv. 1272,
For a discussion of the same problem before the New York State Labor Board, see
(1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 1048.
28. The court refused so to hold in N. L. R. B. v. Colten, 105 F. (2d) 179 (C. C,
A. 6th, 1939).
29. Section 1 declares it to be "the public policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by pro-
tecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and des-
ignation of representatives of their own choosing. See National Licorice Co. v, N. L.
R. B., 309 U. S. 350 (1940); Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co.,
309 U. S. 261 (1940) ; H. R. Ru,. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 24.
30. The Board as an aggrieved party can petition a circuit court of appeals to enforce
one of its orders. 49 STAT. 454 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 160(e), (f) (Supp. 1938). See
Comment (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 472. For failure to comply with the verdict of the
circuit court, the Board may institute a civil contempt proceeding. McCrone v. United
States, 307 U. S. 61 (1939).
31. SPENcFR, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (1935) 47.
* Schaffner v. Harrison, 113 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), cert. granted, 61 Sup.
Ct. 134 (U. S. 1940).
1. The tax on an earned income of $50,000, for example, would be cut in half by
division of that income into two taxable units. See 2 PAUL AND MEILTENs, LAW OF FED-
FRAL INCOmE TAXATION (1934) § 15.01.
2. In spite of the gift tax on this transfer, the donor reduces his income tax, elim-
inates the estate tax entirely and still keeps the income within the family.
arrangements have been hindered by Congressional adherence 3 to the policy
of treating such transactions as those of ordinary individuals 4 instead of
taxing the family as a unit.0
Deflection of income with retention of control offers the advantages of
tax reduction with a minimum of sacrifice. Since legal sanction for such
schemes would result in both serious losses of revenue and an impairment
of the accepted ability-to-pay rationale, the Treasury has sought to outlaw
them before both courts and legislature. As a result of these efforts, legis-
lative support in restricting deflection of income from grantor to beneficiary
through the trust medium has been secured.0 Similar specific Congressional
assistance in preventing deflection of income by the assignment device has
not been forthcoming. Availability of assignments to avoid surtaxes has
consequently depended on the judicial interpretation of the general provisions
of the income tax.7 Taxation of the donor in these cases requires a deter-
mination that he has not given away a sufficient quantum of rights to amount
to a transfer of ownership.
From the confusion of cases involving assignments of all types of income,
a judicial formula for taxability may be distilled. The formula's chief virtue
is its simplicity: if the right to future income is assigned, the assignor pays
a tax; if the property which produces the income is assigned, he does not.8
The doctrine was first formulated in relation to assignments of earned income
and of partnership income, both of which happened to be involved in the
3. A notable exception is the permission to husband and wife to file a joint return.
IxT. Ray. CoDE (1939) § 51(b). This allows tax saving since the capital losses of one
spouse may be used to offset the capital gains of the other. Helvering v. Janney, 9 U. S.
L. WEx 4062 (U. S. 1940). Husband and wife may also make deductions for charitable
contributions up to 15% of their combined incomes. Taft v. Helvering, 9 U. S. L. WEEK
4063 (U. S. 1940).
4. For a discussion of the status of the family under the income tax, see Comment
Income Taxation of Husband and Wife (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1279. This statutory
treatment of the family has been characterized as "an invitation to attempts to divide the
family income as evenly as possible between spouses, in order to keep as much of it as
possible in the lower surtax brackets." MAGIL, TAXABiEa INCOME (1936) 248.
5. In the case of Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U. S. 206 (1931) a state statute
taxing the husband on his wife's income was held unconstitutional by a majority of the
Supreme Court. A tax payable by the family, computed on its combined income and as-
sessing each member in the proportion which his income bears to the total, avoids the
pitfalls of the Hoeper case and would seem to be constitutional.
6. INr. REv. CODE (1939) §§ 166, 167. The effectiveness of these statutory provi-
sions is, in large measure, due to the sympathetic treatment accorded them by the
Supreme Court. See Burnet v. WVells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933); Corliss v. Bowers, 231
U. S. 376 (1930).
7. INT. REv. CODE (1939) § 22(a). In this section gross income is defined in ex-
tremely broad, inclusive terms. Since it was long neglected as a basis for taxation, the
reliance placed on Section 22(a) by the Supreme Court in recent cases is of consider-
able significance. See Helvering v. Horst, 61 Sup. Ct. 144 (1940); Helvering v. Clif-
ford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940); Ray, The Income Tax on Short Termn and Revocable Trusts
(1940) 53 HARv. L. Rav. 1322, 1341 et seq.
8. 2 PAL AND MRTENs, LA W oF FEDEDAL Ico.tE TAXATON. (1934) § 15.03.
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early litigation; when subsequent cases involving the assignment of trust
income arose, an adaptation of the original formula was improvised to apply
to them.
But employment of this judicial formula in litigation has revealed its
inadequacy as a reliable touchstone of tax liability.9 In the recent case of
Schaffner v. Harrison,° the taxpayer was life beneficiary of all income from
a residuary trust created by her husband's will. In the last week of Decem-
ber, 1929, she executed irrevocable assignments totalling $84,000 of the trust
income for 1930 to her three children. In an action to recover income taxes
paid on this assigned income, the beneficiary-assignor won a judgment in the
federal district court." This was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, 12 and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari.13
In deciding that the beneficiary-assignor was not taxable on payments of
trust income to the assignee, both the trial and appellate courts relied exclu-
sively on Blair v. Commissioner.'4 A similar residuary trust was involved
in that case, although the assignment was for the life of the beneficiary, and
not for a single year.15 In holding the beneficiary not taxable on payments
received by the assignee, the Supreme Court said that the beneficiary had
an equitable interest in the corpus of the trust alienable in whole or in part
like other property. Since the assignment of this equitable interest had been
made, the court felt that more than a mere right to future income had been
assigned.
The trial court, considering on the verbalistic level the judicial formula
for taxing assignments of income, frankly admitted that the Blair and
Schaffner cases either might or might not be distinguished.1 Apart from
its inconclusiveness, the analysis made on this level is unsatisfactory because
it loses sight of the principle underlying the formula. The statement that
the property itself must be assigned in order to escape the tax on the income
merely means that, since the tax is imposed on ownership, ownership must
be surrendered in order to escape the tax. When applied without regard to
the quantum of rights passing by the assignment, the formula is devoid of
significance. It is, therefore, quite possible that a realistic analysis of the
9. For a detailed analysis of cases applying this formula and a conclusion that "the
courts have reached results which are bewildering to those not conversant with legal
niceties," see Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1172.
10. 113 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
11. Schaffner v. Harrison, 1 Prentice-Hall 1939 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 5.533 (N. D. Ill.,
1934).
12. Schaffner v. Harrison, 113 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
13. 61 Sup. Ct. 134 (U. S. 1940).
14. 300 U. S. 5 (1937).
15. Although the testator's wife and son first shared equally in the trust income,
the son became entitled to all of it when the wife died in 1923. At that time Ile assigned
to each of his children a $9,000 interest in the annual income of the trust for the rest
of his life. .The assignment was, however, terminable on the death of either party.
16. The Government's distinction between the "vertical" division of the life estate
in the Blair case and the "horizontal" division in the Schaffner case was conceded to be
"plausible," but the court felt the language of the Blair case nevertheless compelled a
decision for the taxpayer.
[Vol, 50
NOTES
rights passing under the one year assignment in the Schaffncr case and the
assignment for life in the Blair case would reveal a discrepancy sufficient
to constitute a sound basis for distinction between the two.
After having made a short term irrevocable assignment of trust income,
for example, the beneficiary of the trust, although deprived of the income
for that term, is reinstated to his original position at the end of that period.
With the assignment for the duration of the life estate, however, the possi-
bility of a reversion to the assignor is remote. At best it would be contingent
upon his surviving the assignee,17 an unlikely event since those assignments
are usually made by parents to children. It would follow that the equitable
reversion left in the transferor under the short term assignment is itself
sufficient to make the arrangement simply an anticipatory assignment of
future income, and not a disposition of property 8
From the assignee's point of view as well, fewer rights pass under the
short term assignment than under one which is made for life. Under the
latter arrangement the assignee is entitled to enjoin breach of the trust,
to surcharge the trustee for such breach, or to compel compliance with the
trust instrument, as well as to sue for his payments of trust income.10 Since
the assignee occupies the position of co-beneficiary, conflict between his
interest and that of the beneficiary is not likely to arise. The rights of the
short term assignee, on the other hand, would be limited to a suit to compel
payment of his share of the trust income. If he were accorded the rights
of a co-beneficiary, confusion in trust administration would result; in that
case the assignee would seek to insure adequate income for a single year,
whereas the beneficiary would be interested in future payments as well.
Although the possibility of merger is absent in a short term assignment
like that in the Schaffner case, it is likely to occur under an assignment
for life. Since the parties to both trust and assignment agreements are usually
members of the same family, it frequently happens that one individual occu-
pies the position of both remainderman and trustee. When such a person
receives the beneficial interest by assignment,2 0 or when one who is simply
remainderman receives the life estate,2 ' partial termination of the trust may
17. The assignee's interest in part of the life estate would ordinarily be descendible
if he died before the trust beneficiary. If the assignment was expressly made terminable
on the death of the assignee as in the Blair case (see note 15 mpra) and that event oc-
curred while the beneficiary was still living, the assigned interest would then revert to
the beneficiary.
18. See Buck, Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance: The DclIcclion of Income
(1936) 23 VA. L. REv. 107, 139.
19. Mitchell v. Carrollton Nat. Bank, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1228, 97 S. AV. 45 (1905)
(trustee compelled at suit of complete assignees to make such sale of property as trust
instrument directed); Zimmerman v. Frailey, 70 Md. 561, 17 Ad. 560 (1889) (trustee
compelled to account to assignee). See 4 BoGMar, TnusTs AND TausTms (1935) pp.
2494-5.
20. Since this results in merger of the legal and equitable titles, the trust is auto-
matically terminated by operation of law. 3 ScoTT, TRusTs (1939) § 341.
21. When remainder and life estate are held by one individual, he may compel par-
tial termination of the trust when it would not violate the trust instrument. 3 Scowr,
TRusTs (1939) §341.
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be compelled, provided, of course, that it is not contrary to the testator's
intent.
Since these transactions are usually carried out by family members intent
upon tax reduction, the existence of legal rights in a life assignment may
be academic; there is little chance that those rights will ever be exercised.
But experience demonstrates that discord may displace harmony at the family
hearthside, and in such event the assignee would be likely to exercise his
rights. Although financial harm to the beneficiary would not result, since
his interests are analogous to those of the assignee, the trust would be
destroyed as the exclusive preserve of the beneficiary and the assignee might
expose the administration to judicial review at inconvenient times. But since
this power would rarely be used, it would be advisable to find additional
grounds for distinguishing a life assignment from one for a short term.
The comparative extent to which the two types of assignment may be em-
ployed for tax avoidance may furnish a convincing basis for distinction
between the two situations. The assignment for life compels the beneficiary
of the trust to pay such a heavy price for reducing taxes that he is not likely
to resort to it. The short term assignment, on the other hand, permits tax
reduction which necessitates comparatively little sacrifice. The beneficiary
may wait until the closing days of December, estimate the trust income for
the next year, and assign the part which exceeds his own requirements.32
Were the two methods of equal legality, virtually all taxpayers would choose
the latter.23 Although the fear of tax avoidance which lies in the background
of most assigned income cases 24 may not have influenced the court in the
Blair case, it is a factor which must be taken into account in short-term as-
signments.
Admittedly cases where trust income is assigned are difficult to decide on
the basis of a judicial formula evolved in relation to another type of prop-
erty. The dichotomy of legal and equitable ownership which distinguishes
trusts from other types of property accounts for the difficulty. Since the
beneficiary's right in the trust is actually only the right to receive payments
of income,25 it would seem that the test of whether future income or the
property which produces it is assigned would break down completely.20 This,
22. Although the assignments in the Schaffner case equalled $84,000 for 1930, they
were reduced to $54,000 for 1931. Variation is not possible under a lifetime assignment
such as that in the Blair case; the beneficiary is held to his original estimate despite the
fact that declining investment returns may curtail trust income so greatly that the
beneficiary himself receives nothing.
23. A national tax service has described the assignment for life as a "sure method-
but sometimes inadvisable" and the short term assignment as "less certain-but other-
wise more desirable." TODAY'S VITAL TAX-SAVING POSSIBILITIES (Prentice-Hall, 1940)
23.
24. See Surrey, Assignments of Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Tax-
able Person (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 791, 793.
25. The numerous rights of the beneficiary against the trustee, such as the right to
sue for an accounting, are incidental to the right to income.
26. One writer admits that "the distinction between an assignment of a trust estate
and the assignment of future income may seem like a shadowy one to the practical mind
because the equitable estate of the trust beneficiary is a use, that is, the right to income."
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of course, makes all the more necessary a thorough analysis by the court of
the fact situation in terms of the incidents of ownership which the beneficiary
has surrendered.
The basis for the petition for certiorari in the Schaffner case was the as-
serted conflict with Helvering v. Cliff ord.27 Although the latter case involved
a five year trust in which the grantor was trustee with extensive powers of
control, as well as reversioner, the Government attempted to apply it as anal-
ogy to the assignment cases.2 The principal obstacle to the validity of such
a comparison is that the control element on which the court placed so much
weight in the Clifford case is absent in the Schaffter case. By the clear lan-
guage of the assignment, the beneficiary transferred all rights to the extent
of the income assigned for the term and, since he was not trustee, he could
have no actual control. It might be argued, of course, that the extreme brev-
ity of the one year term is in itself sufficient to give the grantor substantial
control, but the Clifford case has not as yet been extended thus far.
It seems likely, however, that the Government's reliance on Helvering v.
Clifford in the instant case will not be necessary in view of the more recent
decisions in Helvering v. Horst 30 and Hel'ering v. Eubankl.Y In the Horst
case the bondholder had completely surrendered dominion over the interest
bearing bond coupons, but he was nevertheless taxed on the interest pay-
ments to the donee. Thus retention of control by the assignor seems no
longer necessary in order to subject him to the tax on assigned income. A
possible ground for distinguishing the two cases is that the assignment in the
Schaffner case was made prior to the year in which the trust income would
accrue and the gift in the Horst case was made near the end of the period
during which the interest was to accrue. Yet the language of the opinion
in the Horst case is of such breadth that any such distinction would prob-
ably be unsuccessful. The court considered that the right to dispose of in-
come, and the exercise thereof, were tantamount to actual receipt and enjoy-
ment of income, and therefore, the refusal to receive payments was in effect
a realization of income. This position appears to invalidate virtually all at-
tempts to escape the "embarrassments of ownership" 32 by family transac-
tions.
Yet he feels there is justification for the distinction since "the Revenue Acts accept
property concepts." Buck, Iwome Tax Evasion and Avoidance: Thc Deflection of In-
come (1936) 23 VA. L. Ray. 107, 138. The distinction loses persuasiveness in the light
of the attitude toward property concepts expressed by the Supreme Court in Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
27. 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
28. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Harrison v. Schaffner, Docket No. 437, p. 5
et seq.
29. For the suggestion that such extension is likely, however, see (1940) 49 YAI.
L. J. 1305, 1306, n. 11. Cf. Helvering v. Achelis, 112 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
But see Elizabeth K. Lamont, 43 B. T. A. No. 11 (Dec. 11, 1940).
30. 61 Sup. Ct. 144 (1940).
31. 61 Sup. Ct. 149 (1940).
32. This is part of the phraseology used by Judge Clark in his interesting discus-
sion of the use of the trust device to enable property-owning taxpayers to "have their
cake and eat it too." Clapp v. Heiner, 51 F. (2d) 224 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931).
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The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Eubank holding
an insurance agent taxable on renewal commissions, earned but not pay-
able at the time of the assignment, was based solely on the Horst case, to
the exclusion of previous cases on earned income. Although some circuits
had previously felt compelled by Mr. Justice Holmes' cryptic language in
Lucas v. Earl33 to hold all earned income taxable to the earner, 4 the Second
Circuit Court had felt that the ground for that decision was the control over
future earnings which the assignor retained. 3 By overlooking these prior
distinctions governing assignments of income, the Court apparently intends
to supplant them with the broad propositions of the Horst case.
Although present evaluation of the extent of the Horst and Eubank de-
cisions is premature, it seems clear that they reflect a judicial attitude keenly
aware of the possibilities of tax avoidance by assignment of income. Coupled
with this attitude is an inclination to act under interpretations of the general
provisions of the Revenue Act in order to prevent spoliation of federal rev-
enues, rather than to await remedial legislation from Congress. Under the
logic of the recent cases, it is not inconceivable that the Blair case may be
overruled,3 6 allowing taxation to the beneficiary of trust income assigned
for life. In the instant case a finding that the assignment of trust income for
one year is taxable to the beneficiary would be entirely consistent both with
the present attitude of the Court and with sound tax policy.
REINSTATEMENT OF WILLS UNDER DOCTRINE OF
DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION*
Tnn courts in the United States, following the law of England, have
adopted the doctrine of dependent relative revocation -a device which in
a variety of situations results in the nullification of what otherwise would
appear to be the revocation of a will. The doctrine developed in cases in-
volving destructive acts to a will from the requirement, expressly imposed
by statute or added by judicial construction,' that the revocatory act be done
33. 281 U. S. 111 (1930).
34. Van Meter v. Comm'r, 61 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932). See also Dickey
v. Burnet, 56 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Bishop v. Comm'r, 54 F. (2d) 298
(C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
35. Rossmoore v. Comm'r, 76 F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; Lowery v. Helvering,
70 F. (2d) 713 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). Under this interpretation of Lucas v. Earl, 281
U. S. 111 (1930) the assignment of earned income not yet received would relieve the
earner of tax. See Helvering v. Eubank, 110 F. (2d) 737 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), (1940)
53 HARV. L. REv. 1398.
36. The Blair case represents years of tangled litigation involving numerous pro-
cedural questions. In the case before the Supreme Court, the Government directed the
main force of its argument toward points other than the assignment of income from a
trust. It is possible, therefore, that the decision is not strong authority for the broad
propositions for which it is generally cited.
* Matter of McCaffrey, 174 Misc. 162, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 178 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
1. See 1 PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) § 419.
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by the testator with intent to revoke. Where the testator destroyed his will
by accident, sanction was found in this requirement for the admission of
oral evidence to prove absence of intent. Going beyond absence of intent
to revoke, the courts have reinstated wills shown by informal evidence to
have been revoked by the testator conditionally or under an erroneous belief2
and extended the technique to include cases of revocation by subsequent
instrument.3
A recent New York decision 4 makes the unusual statement that the doc-
trine of dependent relative revocation does not exist in that state, and on
the basis of that statement, reaches a result which seems dearly to defeat
the intention of the testator. Two wills of Identical dispositive provisions
were involved in the case, each of which gave small legacies to two of the
testator's sons and the residue to the third. The later will, which contained
an express revocation clause, was found after the testator's death with the
second of its two typewritten pages cancelled by vertical and diagonal lines
in ink through the final clauses of the will, signature of decedent, and names
and addresses of witnesses. At the bottom of the page the testator had
written: "N.Y. May 16, 1939. The within Will and Testament of John B.
McCaffrey and any copy or duplicate is hereby annulled and cancelled -
that a 'Will dated June 20, 1938 may now be restored to full force and effect.
John B. McCaffrey." The Surrogate, refusing probate to the second will,
held that the notation was ineffectual under the "anti-revival" statute to
revive the prior will,G that the second will was unequivocally revoked with
intent to revoke,6 and that "the history of our statutes, the decisions and our
public policy exclude the existence of the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation as a rule of law in this State."
The evidence seems conclusive that the testator revoked only because he
thought that revival of the prior will by the notation was possible.7 It is
2. See Dobie, Dependent Relative Revocation of Wills (1915) 2 VA. L. RIv. 327;
Roberts, Dependent Relative Revocation of Wills (1901) 49 Am. L. REG. 18. The earliest
use of the technique is usually traced to Onions v. Tyrer, 1 P. Wins. 343, 2 Vern. 741,
24 Eng. Repr. 418 (Ch. 1716).
3. For the development and scope of the doctrine, see. Cornish, Depcndcnt Relative
Revocation (1932) 5 So. CAiu. L. Rav. 273; Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation
(1920) 33 HIv. L. REv. 337.
4. Matter of McCaffrey, 174 Misc. 162, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 178 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
5. N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAw, §41: "If, after the making of any will, the testator
shall duly make and execute a second will, the destruction, canceling or revocation of
such second will, shall not revive the first will, unless it appear by the terms of such
revocationj that it was his intention to revive and give effect to his first %%ill; or unless
after such destruction, canceling or revocation, he shall duly republish his first will."
Although the wording of the statute does not require the result, the phrase "terms of
such revocation" is confined by construction to a revocation by a testamentary instru-
ment. Matter of Stickney, 161 N. Y. 42, 55 N. E. 396 (1899). This point vas not argued
in the McCaffrey case.
6. The revocation statute expressly requires intent to revoke. N. Y. De. EsT.
LAw, § 34.
7. English decisions have applied the doctrine in cases where the testator revoked,
erroneously believing he thus revived a former will. Powell v. Powell, L R. 1 P. & D.
209 (1866) ; Cossey v. Cossey, 69 L. J. 17 (P. D. 1900).
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in this sort of situation-- where a will has been revoked under the erroneous
belief that a valid superseding disposition has been effectuated - that de-
pendent relative revocation is most frequently applied.8 The rationale usually
offered is that the intent to revoke, required to consummate a revocatory
act, is conditional and the revocation fails for non-occurrence of the condi-
tion.0 But some writers maintain that, although in most cases the anivms
revocandi is actually present, courts exercise equitable powers to set aside
a completed revocation on the ground of mistake.10 Whichever is the true
explanation, agreement is general that the doctrine, applied only where it
is clear that the testator, had he known of his mistake or of the non-occur-
rence of the condition, would prefer probate of the revoked will to intestacy,
is a legitimate device designed to effectuate a testator's intentions."1 In view
of the established line of New York cases apparently recognizing the tech-
nique 1 2 and the almost universal acceptance of the doctrine elsewhere,18
the refusal in the principal case to recognize the clear evidence of intention
and the intimation that a will once revoked is forever destroyed 1 4 suggest
8. See Notes (1929) 62 A. L. R. 1367, 1401, (1938) 115 A. L. R. 710, 721.
9. The reasoning appears in the traditional definition of "the doctrine of dependent
relative revocations, in which the act of cancelling, etc., being done with reference to
another act meant to be an effectual disposition, will be a revocation or not, according as
the relative act be efficacious or not." 1 WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS (10th ed. 1905) 110. Coin-
pare Cornish, supra note 3, at 280.
10. Warren, loc. cit. supra note 3; ATKINSON, WILLS (1937), § 162; 1 PAGE, WILLS
(2d ed. 1926) § 449.
11. But see Evans, Testamentary Revocation by Subsequent Instrument (1934) 22
Ky. L. J. 469 (better to disregard the doctrine in subsequent instrument cases); Rob-
erts, supra note 2, at 35 (doctrine is "a departure from the true meaning of the statute
of frauds").
12. The New York Court of Appeals has not passed on the doctrine directly. Cl.
Matter of Tremain, 282 N. Y. 485, 491, 27 N. E. (2d) 19, 22 (1940) (superfluous cita-
tion to the doctrine), aff'g 257 App. Div. 996, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 632 (2d Dep't 1939),
aff'g 169 Misc. 549,7 N. Y. S. (2d) 781 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; Ely v. Megie, 219 N. Y. 112,
113 N. E. 800 (1916) (doctrine summarized and dehors distinction, infra note 24, adopt-
ed) ; Austin v. Oakes, 117 N. Y. 577, 597, 23 N. E. 193, 197 (1890) (conditional reason-
ing employed to nullify revo~atory effect of dispositions failing dehors) ; see also Matter
of Raisbeck, 52 Misc. 279, 102 N. Y. Supp. 967 (Surr. Ct. 1906) (doctrine applied in
case of cancellations accompanied by ineffective alterations) ; Matter of Tousey, 34 Misc.
363, 69 N. Y. Supp. 846 (Surr. Ct. 1901) (summary of doctrine where mistake appears
on face of revoking instrument-refusal to extend it to execution of will) ; McPherson v.
Clark, 3 Bradf. 92 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1854) (anonymous use of the principle to set aside
partial revocation), following Jackson v. Holloway, 7 Johns. 394 (N. Y. 1811). The
Surrogate found that the doctrine has never been recognized in the state. Matter of
McCaffrey, 174 Misc. 162, 168, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 178, 185 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
13. The doctrine has been outlawed in no other jurisdiction. It continues to gain
recognition, In re Roeder's Estate, 106 P. (2d) 847 (N. M. 1940), and has been said to
be "part of the general technique of kll common-law jurisdictions." Evans, Depenident
Relative Revocation (1928) 16 Ky. L. J. 251, 253.
14. "If he made the notation at the same time as the obliteration it was equally
futile to save the will from his own act in revoking it. Even in the notation Mr. McCaf-
frey declared that it was 'annulled and cancelled.' The intent to revoke and the com-
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the presence of fundamental objections to the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation.
A possible criticism of the doctrine may be founded on the inconsistency
with which it has been applied 1 and the tendency to use it as a rule of
thumb.' 6 This objection, however, should not justify complete elimination
of the principle, for it can be obviated by more careful attention to the facts
of the particular case and by the imposition of limitations on the use of
the doctrine. From such a point of view, dependent relative revocation
should be applied to nullify revocations only where the evidence affirmatively
indicates' 7 that the deceased would prefer reinstatement of the revoked will
to intestacy. If a will is revoked by a subsequent instrument, and the revo-
cation is made expressly conditional, the intention of the testator that the
will should be probated on non-occurrence of the condition is apparent.18
But if, instead of a condition, only a reason for the revocation appears on
the face of the revoking instrument, and the reason is erroneous, 0 it is
possible that the testator would have revoked even had he known of his
mistake.20 In such instances dependent relative revocation should be invoked
to set aside the revocation only if the surrounding circumstances 2  and the
provisions of each document = clearly support the conclusion that the testator
would prefer the revoked will to operate. Similar considerations should
govern the nullification of the revocatory effect of a subsequent will,23 some
pleted act under the statute again destroyed the instrument forever. His apparent ig-
norance of the law in respect of a revival of his prior will may not be deemed to b2 a
condition, precedent or contemporaneous, sufficient to undo his unequivocal act of revoca-
fion." Matter of McCaffrey, 174 Misc. 162, 167, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 178, 184 (Surr. Ct.
1940).
15. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 35 and the criticism of the refusal to recognize the
doctrine where a later revoking instrument fails for incapacity of the devisee in Warren,
supra note 3, at 353 et seq.
16. See (1938) 26 ILL. B. J. 214.
17. Warren recommends a test of reasonable clearness. Warren, supra note 3, at 356.
18. The courts observe the testator's wishes without invoking dependent relative
revocation. See 1 PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) §449.
19. Under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, mistake in the inducement
of a revocation, appearing on the face of a revoking instrument, is sufficient to set it
aside. Whitlock v. Vann, 38 Ga. 562 (1868); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 96 N. J. Eq. 501, 126
Atl. 744 (Ch. 1924); Mordecai v. Boylan, 6 Jones Eq. 365 (N. C. 1863); Campbell v.
French, 3 Ves. 321, 30 Eng. Repr. 1033 (Ch. 1797).
20. This would be probable if the fact about which the mistake is made is one pecu-
liarly within the testator's knowledge. If this is the case, American courts refuse to apply
dependent relative revocation. Giddings, Ex'r v. Giddings, 65 Conn. 149, 32 At. 334
-(1894) (revocation based on erroneous statement that testator's house had been sold);
Hayes' Ex'rs v. Hayes, 21 N. J. Eq. 265 (1871) (legacy reduced because testator had
Trovided home for legatee; testator in fact had not done so) ; Mendinhall's Appeal, 124
Pa. 387, 16 At. 881 (1889) (previous gift of stock and loan to husband of legatee
stated as reason for revocation of legacy).
21. See 9 WIGMORE, EvIDEVcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2470.
22. See Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R. I. 99 (1852).
23. A subsequent instrument may revoke an earlier will by an express revocatory
clause or by the inconsistency of its provisions with those of the earlier ,ill. Presence
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of whose particular dispositions fail under the operation of some rule of
law dehors the instrument:24 e.g., where the beneficiary is a charity, but
the gift fails to comply with rules governing charitable bequests. 26 If a
beneficiary named in a particular disposition of the revoked will is dis-
qualified from taking an equal or larger share provided by the later instru-
ment, restoration of the former revoked provision is supported by the evi-
dence.26  But a substantial reduction of a bequest21 or a change of bene-
ficiary,28 introducing doubt as to the result that the testator would prefer,
should be sufficient to preclude reinstatement of the earlier disposition.
In cases of revocation by destructive act to the instrument, admission of
the testator's oral declarations of intent2" provides additional evidence which
might justify application of the doctrine. Evidence of the testator's declara-
tions that the revocation was motivated by a mistake of law or fact warrants
use of dependent relative revocation only if examination of the dispositions
and surrounding circumstances confirm the conclusion that the revocation
would not have been made but for the mistake. From such evidence, for
example, it may clearly appear that a will would not have been destroyed
had the testator known that an instrument intended as a substitute would
of the revocatory clause should be treated only as some evi4ence of intention. Compare
Cornish, supra note 5, at 308. In cases not involving dependent relative revocation courts
refuse to give effect to such clauses where to do so would violate the plain purpose of
the testator. Allen v. Beemer, 372 Ill. 295, 23 N. E. (2d) 724 (1939) ; Matter of Smith,
254 N. Y. 283, 172 N. E. 499 (1930).
24. A will defectively executed is inoperative as a revocation under modern statutes
without resort to dependent relative revocation. ATKICNSON, WILLS § 160. In the absence
of an express revocatory clause in the later will, provisions inconsistent with those of a for-
mer will are deprived of revocatory effect if they fail for some reason outside the instrument,
Austin v. Oakes, 117 N. Y. 577, 23 N. E. 193 (1890); Estate of Marx, 174 Cal. 762,
164 Pac. 640 (1917) (using dependent relative revocation technique) ; Blackford v. An-
derson, 226 Iowa 1138, 286 N. W. 735 (1939) (using dependent relative revocation tech-
nique), (1940) 24 MINN. L. REv. 298. Contra: Wheat v. Lacals, 139 Miss. 300, 104 So.
73 (1925). But where dispositions which fail dehors are coupled with a valid revocation
clause, the courts usually refuse to set aside the revocation by the dependent relative
revocation technique, or otherwise. Ely v. Megie, 219 N. Y. 112, 113 N. E. 800 (1916);
Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 Atl. 679 (1914). Contra: Security Co. v. Snow, 70
Conn. 288, 39 Ati. 153 (1898). This dehors distinction has been criticized in Warren,
mtpra note 3, at 357.
25. Ely v. Megie, 219 N. Y. 112, 113 N. E. 800 (1916) (charity prevented from
taking because gift was executed within two months of death) ; see Cornish, mtpra note 3,
286 et seq.
26. Restoration of particular clauses should be allowed in spite of a finding that in
all other respects the revocation should stand. See the argument of counsel in Ely v.
Megie, 219 N. Y. 112, 136, 113 N. E. 800, 806 (1916) ; Evans, supra note 11, 490 el seq.
27. However, if the testator cuts off an heir in the revoking will, it might be argued
that he would prefer reinstatement of the revoked bequest to prevent the heir from tak-
ing a much larger share by intestate succession.
28. See Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 Atd. 679 (1914); Dudley v. Gates, 124
Mich. 440, 83 N. W. 97 (1900).




be refused probate.30 But if the intent was to execute a substitute will in
the fuiture, and death prevented its completion, the doctrine should be applied
to reinstate the original will only if there is clear justification for the infer-
ence that the intent to revoke was dependent upon the efficacy of the
prospective disposition.3 ' Frequently, evidence of the testator's intention is
available from comparison of the revoked and substituted dispositions; this
is the case where parts of a will are cancelled and ineffective alterations
interlined.3 2 Under such circumstances the doctrine should not operate to
avoid a partial revocation unless comparison reveals that the testator's prob-
able preference would thus be achieved.33
More fundamental as an objection to dependent relative revocation is the
contention implicit in the principal case that the techniques classified under
its heading, thriving on parol evidence and speculation as to the intentions
of the deceased, contravene the purpose of wills statutes.&3 4 Prominent in
the law of wills is the policy which, sacrificing quantity of evidence to quality,
denies effect to informal evidence of intent for fear that such evidence may
not represent the actual intentions of the deceased, who is unavailable to
clarify or contradict the testimony of others.3 5 This policy, however, cannot
consistently be used to justify complete elimination of the doctrine. The
doctrine is not an isolated one; it involves the application of rules obtaining
in the law of wills generally. In cases of revocation by act to the instrument,
the admission of oral evidence of intent, sanctioned by the requirement of
ainus revocandi, is generally recognized.30 Where a subsequent instrument
is the method of revocation, the technique of dependent relative revocation
in determining the testator's intent from interpretation of both revoked and
30. Compare Strong's Appeal, 79 Conn. 123, 63 At. 1089 (1906) ; Flanders v. White,
142 Ore. 375, 18 P. (2d) 823 (1933), with Sanderson v. Norcross, 242 Mass. 43, 136
N. E. 170 (1922).
31. The courts are cautious when the substitute is only contemplated. Estate of Olm-
stead, 122 Cal. 224, 54 Pac. 745 (1898) ; Townshend v. Howard, 86 Me. 285, 29 At. 1077
(1894); In re Dougan's Estate, 152 Ore. 235, 53 P. (2d) 511 (1936).
32. Cases of partial revocation provide a fertile field for dependent relative revo-a-
tion. See In rc Roeder's Estate, 106 P. (2d) 847 (N. M. 1940) ; Walter v. Walter, 301
Mass. 289, 17 N. E. (2d) 199 (1938). A questionable presumption of conditional intent
has developed. See Notes (1929) 62 A. L. R. 1367, 1401, (1938) 115 A. L. R. 710, 721.
33. The same considerations should govern as in cases of revocation by subsequent
instrument. Compare Ruel v. Hardy, 6 A. (2d) 753 (N. H. 1939) and Estate of Rauch-
fuss, 232 Wis. 266, 287 N. W. 173 (1939) with Carpenter v. Wynn, 252 Ky. 543, 67 S.
XV. (2d) 688 (1934). See Evans, Testantentary Revocation by Aet to the Document and
Dependent Relative Revocation (1935) 23 Ky. L. J. 559, 580.
34. See also Roberts, supra note 2, at 35.
35. "The whole statute proceeds on the principle that the hazard, that in some cases
the real intentions of the deceased may be violated, . . . is not to be compared with the
danger, that the claims of those whom the law would entitle to his estate, may be de-
feated by fraud and perjury, if any other than the most certain and solemn evidence of
intention is permitted to be introduced." REPoRr OF Rgvismz s oF N. Y. STATUrru S OF
1827-1828, pt. II, c. VI, § 61, in 3 N. Y. REv. STAT. (2d ed. 1836) 634.
36. THomPsox, WnLLs (2d ed. 1936) § 151.
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revoking instruments in the light of surrounding circumstances, merely adopts
conventional rules applied in any problem of construing wills.
37
The emphasis placed in the decision on the New York "anti-revival"
statute, in spite of the proponent's concession that the attempt to revive the
prior will was futile, suggests an additional objection to the doctrine. Since
the two wills were identical in their dispositive provisions, nullification of
the revocation of the second will by dependent relative revocation would
accomplish the same result as revival of the first, a result expressly excluded
in New York by the "anti-revival" statute.38 In a broad sense, it is true,
dependent relative revocation may be said to accomplish a revival of a re-
voked will. " Doctrinally, however, the situation can be distinguished from
a case of revival: revival, confined to the situation covered by the statute,
involves the restoration of the first will and dependent relative revocation
the restoration of the second will.
The future effect of statements repudiating dependent relative revocation
is uncertain. The variety of situations to which the doctrine has been applied,
with the desirable result of approximating the testator's intention, makes
it unlikely that the ban would affect the many techniques grouped under
its formula. In view of its utility and general recognition, its rejection in
general terms in the McCaffrey case seems unfortunate, as does the unwilling-
ness of the court to utilize it to effectuate the intent of the testator.
37. See TroarpsoN, CONSTRUCTION OF WU.Ls (1928) § 41 for the cardinal rule of
wills construction that the intent of the testator should be effectuated.
38. In the common law courts, a destructive act to a subsequent revoking will re-
vived the prior will. 1 PAGE, WILLS § 444. The ecclesiastical rule revived the revoked
will if the testator so intended. Id. §443. "In both courts, however, the law is undis-
puted, that parol evidence is admissible to ascertain the real intentions of the testator,
and to determine the fact of a revival of his will, or a designed intestacy." RsiomiT or
REVISERS OF N. Y. STATUTES OF 1827-1828, supra note 35, at 633. Some "anti-revival"
statutes are modelled on the New York statute, supra note 5, which specifically is di-
rected at revival by revocation of a revoking will. Others follow the English Statute of
Wills, which prohibits in general terms the revival, otherwise than by republication or
re-execution of a wilf in any manner revoked. See Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills
(1929) 14 Iow,\ L. REv. 283, 308; Terrier, Revival of a Revoked Will (1940) 28 CALn'I.
L. REv. 265.
39. In most cases the testator intended to revoke, but the courts attach a contrary-
to-fact condition to the intent. See ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) § 162. Rationalized on the
basis of mistake, supra note 10, the doctrine nullifies revocations for equitable reasons.
Under either approach a revoked will is "revived" without statutory republication or re-
execution. Compare Cornish, supra note 3, at 279. But see Evans, Testamentary Revoca-
tion by Act to the Document and Dependent Relative Revocation (1935) 23 Ky. L. j
559, 576; Evans, Testamentary Revocation by Subsequent Instrument (1934) 22 v.
L.. J. 469, 493.
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ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN LOCAL HOUSING
AUTHORITIES AND CITY COUNCILS*
MucHa of the effectiveness of the present federal public housing pro.riam'
will depend on the enforceability of "cooperation contracts" made between
city councils and local housing authorities at the inception of local hittsing
projects. Typical cooperation contracts are agreements which require the
city to demolish slum housing units equal in number to the units of the new
project, to zone or rezone the neighborhood of the project, to prosvide a play
area for its inhabitants, to grant tax exemption, or to furnish light and water
free of charge.2 The importance of these contracts in determining the phy~i-
cal and social character of housing projects is plain: if they are held not too
bind city councils, many of the professed aims of the housing program will
be rendered nugatory. However, to the extent that municipal action is in-
volved in the contracts, their enforcement will restrict the exercise of powers
which, it is frequently held, are delegated to city councils b the states and
cannot be waived by contract.
In a recent case,3 the Montana Supreme Court denied an attempt by the
city council to avoid the terms of a contract between the council and the
local housing authority. During the initial phases of the housing project in
the city of Great Falls, the local housing authority entered into a contract
with the city council in which the council promised to vacate certain streets
involved in the project and to zone and rezone an area around it. After a
loan to finance the project had been obtained from the USHA, and after con-
struction contracts had been let, a succeeding council refused to enact the
ordinances called for in the contract. At the instance of the local hisuing
authority, the state supreme court issued a writ of mandamus directing the
council to enact the requisite ordinances.
The present federal housing program is a hybrid made up of elements .f
federal, state, and local governmental power. The federal government,
through the USHA, furnishes a large proportion of the money for lical
projects, and exerts a varying amount of direction and control during variu,
phases.4 The states through enabling statutes r set up the governmental ma-
*State ex rel. Great Falls Housing Auth. v. City of Great Falls, 100 P. (2d) 415
(Mont. 1940).
1. As administered by the USHA under the United States Housing Act, il) SvTr.
888 (1937), 42 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq. (Supp. 1938).
2. Section 10(a) of the Act, 50 STAT. 891 (1937), 42 U. S. C. § 1410 ISupp. 1931),
provides that any contract for annual contributions by the USHA to a local project must
contain a condition requiring equivalent slum elimination. Section 15(4). 50 S-x.r. 895
(1937), 42 U. S. C. § 1415(4) (Supp. 1938), provides that a loan contract may contain
a condition requiring the maintenance of a play area. Tax exemption and the furnishing
of services are among the methods by which a city may make contributions to a project.
as suggested in USHA Bulletin 6, Feb. 17, 1938, 24 C. F. R. 631.3 11939).
3. State ex rel. Great Falls Housing Auth. v. City of Great Falls, 1NO P. (2,1)
915 (font 1940).
4. The USHA may furnish up to 90% of the acquisition and development cost -of a
project [50 STAT. 891 (1937), 42 U. S. C. § 1409 (Supp. 1938)] and may contribute there-
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chinery by which city councils are given discretion to bring local housing
authorities into being.0 And local authorities, as agencies of the states,7 ad-
minister the projects once they have been undertaken. Typically, a city coun-
cil, upon a finding that housing conditions dangerous to the public welfare
exist within the city, appoints local housing authority commissioners, who
obtain a certificate of incorporation as a housing authority from the state's
secretary of state.8 The local authority then applies to the USHA for a
loan and either a grant of money or a promise of annual contributions to the
project. The loan is in the form of bonds of the local housing authority, with
a term not in excess of sixty years, in an amount up to 90% of the acquisi-
tion and development cost of the project, the bonds being bought by the
federal authority;9 the annual contributions may be promised for a period
up to sixty years, may be sufficiently large to meet payments on the bonds'
principal and interest, and must be applied to that use.' 0 It is at the time of
after to its upkeep [50 STAT. 891 (1937), as amended June 21, 1938, 52 STAT. 820, 42 U.
S. C. § 1410 (Supp. 1938)].
Prior to the signing of a loan contract and a contract for annual contributions, the
USHA may, under rules promulgated pursuant to § 8 of the Act [50 STAT. 891 (1937),
42 U. S. C. § 1408 (Supp. 1938)], supervise the details of the inception of a project, its
location and physical aspects, and the terms of the cooperation contract between the
local authority and city council. The rules, issued originally as USHA Bulletins, appear
in 24 C. F. R. §§ 601-633, inclusive.
After loan and contribution contracts have been signed, and until construction of a
project is completed, the USHA may secure indirectly the city's performance of a co-
operative contract through use of a conditional power to rescind its promise of a loan,
the power being reserved to it in the loan contract. 24 C. F. R. 601.1. Once a project is
completed, the USHA may interfere directly only in the event that the low-rent Char-
acter of the project is abandoned. In such a case, the federal authority may terminate
annual contributions [50 STAT. 895 (1937), 42 U. S. C. § 1415(3) (Supp. 1938)] or may
declare the unpaid principal of its loan due forthwith [50 STAT. 895 (1937), 42 U. S. C.
8 1415(1) (Supp. 1938)).
5. State housing acts have now been passed in all but the following states: Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah,
and Wyoming. For an indication of the status of state legislation as of March 1, 1937,
see COMPREHENSIVE HousiNG LEGISLATION CHART (U. S. Nat'l Emergency Council,
1937).
6. In Montana, the council, upon a petition and hearing, makes a finding of need
for a local project prior to the creation of the local authority. MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
(Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 5309.4. In New Jersey, the local authority is created
simply by ordinance of the municipality. N. J. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1938) tit. 55, c. 14A,
§ 4. In Illinois, the finding of need for a project is made by the state housing board; the
appointment of the local authority members is made by the mayor. ILL.. ANN. STAT.
(Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1940) c. 67Y2, §3.
7. ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1940) c. 672, § 3; MONT. REv. CoDE.
ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 5309.4; N. J. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1938) tit. 55,
c. 14A, § 4.1.
8. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 5309.4.
9. 50 STAT. 891 (1937) 42 U. S. C. § 1409 (Supp. 1938).




the negotiation for a sale of its bonds and the securing of a grant of money
or a promise of annual contributions that the local authority makes its co-
operation contract with the city council.
The validity of these cooperation contracts must be determined against
a background of municipal corporations law. Courts have frequently been
called on to decide whether, in the absence of fraud, irregularity, or express
statutory prohibition,11 a municipal council is to be held to a cuurse of action
to which it has previously purported to commit itself, either by entering
into a formal contract or by enacting an ordinance, "accepted" in some in-
stances by the private party involved. In general, a council may contract
in aid of those powers and in the course of those activities which are ex-
pressly or impliedly provided for in its charter or which are inherently neces-
sary or appropriate if it is to fulfill the objects for which it w%-as consti-
tuted ;'2 but in so doing it may not, without express statutory authorization,' 3
bargain away its legislative discretion.1 4 The restrictive half of the rule-
that a council may not bargain away its legislative discretion-has been in-
terpreted by some courts as meaning that the council's legislative power re-
mains unaffected regardless of the terms of a contract, and by other courts
as setting up a forbidden field of contractual action, the penalty for trespass
therein being invalidity of the contract. Under the first interpretation, a con-
tract involving a council's legislative discretion is voidable for just cause at
the instance of the city, but not of the other party ;15 under the second, it is
void, and may be repudiated at will by either party' 0 "Bargaining away," as
used by the courts in this context, seems to mean "impairment" of the coun-
cil's freedom to act, or an attempt to "embarrass or restrict" that freedom.' 7
11. 3 McQumnux, AfumciAe CORPOaTIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 1270.
12. 3 MCQUILnIN, MuNiciPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 1269; 1 Du.Lo:;, Mu-
NIcIPAL COPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 237.
13. Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 274, 277 (1903); Puget
Sound Traction Co. v. Reynolds, 223 Fed. 371, 375 (W. D. Wash. 1915). But see Mc-
Bean v. Fresno, 112 Cal. 159, 163, 44 Pac. 358, 359 (1896).
14. 3 MCQUn.Liz, MfuNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 1271. Frequently
quoted is Judge Cooley's statement in City of Pontiac v. Carter, 32 'Mich. 164, 171
(1875): "A city cannot by contract deprive itself of any of its legislative powers. They
are conferred upon it to be exercised again and again as long, and as often, as occasion
shall require." See Plant Food Co. v. City of Charlotte, 214 N. C. 518, 520, 199 S. E.
712, 714 (1938).
15. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Arkansas City, 76 Fed. 271, 280 (C. C. A. 8th,
1896); Carlyle Water Co. v. City of Carlyle, 31 Ill. App. 325, 339 (1889).
16. City of Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 542, 4 S. W. 143 (187);
Penley v. City of Auburn, 85 Me. 278, 27 Ad. 158 (1893) ; State cx rel. St. Paul v.
Minnesota Transfer Ry., 80 Minn. 108, 83 N. W. 32 (1900).
17. A bargaining away has been held to occur when the council attempts to abrogate
its power in favor of a private individual or corporation as it does when, having been
given power in its charter to operate a water system, it gives an exclusive 25-year fran-
chise to a private company [City of Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 542, 4 S.
V. 143 (1887)]; or when a council makes a contract which by implication commits it
to a second course of action, as when, by contracting to reimburse an attorney by paying
him a yearly percentage of its profits from a ferry, it impliedly binds itself not to oper-
ate the ferry free of charge during the term of the contract [Vaterbury & Co. v. City of
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In giving content to the term "legislative discretion," courts have custom-
arily held that a council has certain powers which are governmental, others
which are proprietary.18 Since this approach assumes that legislative discre-
tion is always called into play when a council exercises governmental powers
and never otherwise, courts have held that a council may contract only with
respect to those powers which are proprietary.'0 Although relatively few of
the cases which have made use of the governmental-proprietary formula have
included any statement of the way in which the formula was derived, the
classification seems to have been made variously,* either on the basis of the
source of the power,20 the abstract nature of the power,21 or the general
activity involved.2 2 These categories apparently represent variants of a no-
tion that sovereign power is that which is granted by the legislature to the
city to be exercised in one set of activities, all undertakings so classed being
entirely governmental, in contrast to private power which inheres in the city,
and is exercised to provide another set of services, all of which are entirely
proprietary. This formal consistency, which denied the possibility of a
"hybrid" municipal activity, has, however, not been uniformly maintained.23
Laredo, 68 Tex. 565, 5 S. W. 81 (1887); or when, by contracting to maintain a bridge
in repair for all time, it impliedly binds itself not to change the dimensions of the bridge
[Northern Pac. Ry. v. State ex rel. Duluth, 208 U. S. 583 (1908)].
18. Seafeldt v. Port of Astoria, 141 Ore. 418, 16 P. (2d) 943 (1932).
19. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Arkansas City, 76 Fed. 271, 282 (C. C. A. 8th,
1896).
20. Those powers which the board has received by express or implied grant front
the legislature have been held to be governmental, while inherent powers have been held
to be proprietary. 3 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 935. This
view involves the idea that the city may not impair those powers which it holds "as a
trust for the state." State e.r rel. St. Paul v. Minnesota Transfer Ry., 80 Minn. 108, 116,
83 N. W. 32, 35 (1900).
21. "A city has two classes of powersi-the one legislative, public, governmental, inl
the exercise of which it is a sovereignty and governs its people; the other proprietary,
quasi-private, conferred upon it, not for the purpose of governing its people, but for the
private advantage of the inhabitants of the city and of the city itself as a legal person-
ality." Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Arkansas City, 76 Fed. 271, 282 (1896).
22. The various services or activities of the city are classed as governmental or
proprietary, the power involved in the service or activity being governmental or proprie-
tary accordingly. Streets and sewers are governmental. Wills v. Los Angeles, 209 Cal.
448, 287 Pac. 962 (1930) ; Town of Tempe v. Corbell, 17 Ariz. 1, 147 Pac. 745 (1915).
Electricity and water supply are proprietary. Pikes Peak Power Co. v. Colorado Springs,
105 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900); Chicago, St. P. Ry. v. Black River Falls, 193 Wis.
579, 214 N. W. 451 (1927).
23. Even though power to engage in certain activities may have been judicially de-
termined as originating in a grant from the legislature, courts have later permitted coun-
cils to contract in the conduct of these activities. The later decisions infer that tile
activity at issue has become proprietary. Crawfordsville v. Braden, 130 Ind. 149, 28 N.
E. 849 (1891) (furnishing of electricity by a city to its inhabitants upheld as an exer-
cise of police power); Mayor of Rome v. Cabot, 28 Ga. 50 (1859) (similar holding as to
furnishing of water); Opinion of the Justices, 150 Mass. 592, 24 N. E. 1084 (1890)
(similar holding as to furnishing of electricity). See Plant Food Co. v. Charlotte, 214
N. C. 518, 520, 199 S. E. 712, 714 (1938): "The line between powers classified as gov-
ernmental and those classified as proprietary is none too sharply drawn, and is subject
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Still other courts, considering governmental power as s ynonyanuu, with police
power, have looked only to the compulsive terms of contracts, an have dik-
allowed those in which they felt there was an undue impairment if the p lice
power, without regard for the general activity involved and withis ut attempting
to determine the source or nature of the Power being exercised.
4
A number of courts have applied traditional doctrines and defended their
results on considerations of expediency or policy.25 Other courts have made
policy the sole basis of decision and, finding that the end originally siught
to be served by a contract was legitimate and within the scope of a cuuncil's
powers, have looked only to see whether the contract was a reatonable means
to that end, in which case the contract has been upheld ;-, or to see whether
public welfare would be endangered by sustaining the contract, in which
case it has been stricken down.2
7
When faced with housing cooperation contracts, courts should have no
difficulty in. sustaining them under already existing municipal contract law.
In those states in which Housing Cooperation Acts or their equivalent have
been passed, clear statutory warrant authorizing contracts such as the one
in question exists.2 s In the principal case, the court was able to make use of
such legislation.2 9 It would seem desirable, however, nut to sustain contract:
solely on the ground of statutory authorization, since it is at least possible
that authorizing statutes may be repealed. If housing were classed a a
proprietary function of the city government, contracts made to provide housing
would not be vulnerable to attack. The doctrines which consider as govern-
mental the city's sovereign power to rule its citizens, and as proprietary the
to change of front as society advances and conceptions of the functions of g-vernmnt
are modified under its insistent demands."
24. Contracts which would bind a council's rate-making puw er, fur V.amnile, hae
been held bad regardless of what rates were involved. Freeport Water 0o. v. Freelort,
180 U. S. 587 (1901) ; San Francisco-Oakland Terminal Rys. v. Alameda, 21i Fed. , '9
(N. D. Cal. 1914). Likewise as to contracts to pass ordinances. flurn v. Pittsburgh,
266 Pa. 128, 109 Ati. 614 (1920); New York, N. H. & H. Ry. v. New Ruchelle, 2-1
Misc. 195, 60 N. Y. Supp. 904 (Sup. Ct. 1899) (alternative holding!.
25. Walla Walla v. W\ater Co., 172 U. S. 1, 15, (1898) ; accord, Uutchvs Union C,.
v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746, 750 (1884).
26. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction WVokrk., l J U. S. Sts, 317
(1905); Balch v. Utica, 42 App. Div. 562, 59 N. Y. Supp. 513 (4th.Dep't l f, 'd.
168 N. Y. 651, 61 N. E. 1127 (1901); Louisville v. Weible. 94 Ky. 240, 1 S. W. -195
(1886); Plant Food Co. v. Charlotte, 214 N. C. 518, 199 S. E. 712 cl"3Xj.
27. Rochester v. Gutberlett, 211 N. Y. 309, 105 N. E. 54 (15141 ; accord, Xorth-
western Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 09 (1878); Butchers Union C,. v.
Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746 (1884).
28. A minority of the states have passed such acts. See, for e.amlplc, C",Lo. S-fT.
ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1939) c. 82, §2; L . GEN. STAT. ANN. tkDart, 1939) §t(, 9-32;
N. J. Rmv. STAT. (Supp. 1938) tit. 55, c. 14B, §4; N. Y. PV1UL1c Hkousi::6 L1w, art. V;
TEx. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1940) art. 1269) 1. In general, thce statutc
authorize municipal councils to contract with local housing authoritie. %ith reference tu
tax concessions, municipal services, play areas, zoning, etc.
"29. AfoxT. REv. CODEs ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 5309.31.
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power by which it contracts for their private benefit,3 0 are so flexible that
courts should have no difficulty in making this classification. Such a finding
involves no inconsistency with recent cases holding housing legislation consti-
tutional as a valid exercise of the state's police power, as well as tax and
eminent domain powers ;31 although some courts have looked on police power
as synonymous with governmental power, here the term is not only used for
different purposes, but the proposed action is in fact within many definitions
of proprietary activity. Once housing is classified as proprietary, there is
authority for disregarding the fact that contracts made in aid of that activity
involved other incidental municipal activities which have been held to be
governmental.3 2 It would seem preferable, however, that in passing on these
contracts courts avail themselves of the more flexible rule - that if the aim
is legitimate and the means reasonable, the contract is valid. Since the aim
of these cooperation contracts is undoubtedly both legitimate and desirable,
and the means involved eminently practical, thare would seem to 'be no justi-
fication for striking down the contract until such time as the city could show
either that the other party had breached the contract or that continued en-
forcement would work against the public welfare.
The question of a cooperation contract's validity will arise either during
the early stages of a project, if the council refuses to enact an ordinance or
resolution required by the terms of the contract, or during later stages if,
having made an enactment, the council seeks to undo what has been done or
to cease doing what was required by the contract. Differing circumstances
will, of course, affect the contracts at different times and, under the rule sug-
gested above, it does not follow that, because a contract is enforced at one
time, its validity is not to be questioned thereafter.33 Moreover, the forms
of action through which local housing authorities might seek enforcement of
these contracts would make possible a* flexible treatment of them. Presui-
ably, mandamus is the proper remedy through which to obtain enactment of
necessary ordinances or resolutions, while injunction would be appropriate
at later stages of a project to prevent abrogation of a still desirable contract.
Conventionally mandamus will issue only to compel the performance of a
ministerial dtity.34 As creation of a housing authority is preceded by the
city council's finding of conditions dangerous to the public welfare, the co-
operation contract must be taken as representing the council's judgment as
to measures necessary to remedy existing conditions. If, as will normally
30. Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 147 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906), app. dismissed,
207 U. S. 584 (1907) ; Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Arkansas City, 76 Fed. 271, 282
(C. C. A. 8th, 1896).
31. See note 23 supra.
32. Pikes Peak Power Co. v. Colorado Springs, 105 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900)
(semble) ; Carlyle Water Co. v. City of Carlyle, 31 Ill. App. 325 (1889) (semble).
33. See Walla Walla v. Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 15 (1898); Louisville v. Weible,
84 Ky. 290, 296, 1 S. W. 605, 607 (1886).
34. See generally FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL Ra-IEDIES (1926) c. 14, 17;
2 BAILEY, HABEAS CORPUS (1913) § 197 et seq.; HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REmEDIus
(3d ed. 1896) c. 1, 2, 5. On mandamus to legislative bodies, see FERIS, EXTRAORDINARY
LEGAL REaaIEs (1926) § 285.
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happen, petitions for mandamus are made shortly thereafter, conditions will
not have changed to the extent that imputation of a ministerial duty to exe-
cute the contract would be improper. 35 In a later injunction proceeding,
courts would be free to inquire into conflicting factors toward sustaining or
defeating the contract. Accordingly, there need be no fear that by sustaining
a contract at one stage it would have been given life beyond the time when
it would continue to serve the best interest of the city.
Establishment of the validity of cooperation contracts is, of course, of
crucial importance to the present federal housing program. That city councils
will in all instances render voluntary compliance with the terms of the con-
tracts is not likely. At the time the contracts are made, however, two fac-
tors place considerable influence in the federal authority's hands. One is
that, aside from the social benefits, they represent almost clear gain to cities
to the extent that federal funds are ultimately made available to local laborers,
material-men, and contractors. The other is that, at the time the coopera-
tion contracts are being considered, unlimited discretion as to the grant-
ing of loans rests with the federal authority. With both factors in mind,
councils may well agree to do more toward the improvement of projects than
they otherwise would. If for no other reason, it would be unduly optimistic
to expect that in all cases, once contracts have been made, city councils will
of their own accord be zealous in carrying out their provisions. Despite re-
quirements in state housing acts of findings that conditions dangerous to the
public welfare exist, any presumption that councils will be guided solely by
considerations of social improvement, to the exclusion of members' personal
interest or political allegiance, seems unfounded. The execution of these con-
tracts presumably will be opposed to the extent that interests of various
groups are adversely affected. Owners of neighboring tenements, property
owners who will be injured by the closing of streets or by new zoning laws,
and city administrators beset with budgetary problems, to suggest but a
few, will be among those likely to exert various sorts of influence on city
councils to the end that cooperation contracts be breached.P0 The likelihood
35. The Montana court took such action in the instant case. State ex rM. Great Falls
Housing Auth'y v. City of Great Falls, 100 P. (2d) 915 (Mont. 1940).
36. The experience of the New Haven Housing Authority in attempting to secure
compliance by the Board of Aldermen with the terms of a cooperation contract indi-
cates the opposition that may arise. A civic association, made up of property owners in
the vicinity of the project, charged the Housing Authority with "pushing them off po-
tentially valuable land" [New Haven Journal-Courier, July 19, 1940, p. 8, col. 1] and
engaged in protracted opposition designed primarily to block the vacating of streets as
provided by the cooperation contract. Prior to the meeting of the Board of Aldermen
at which a final vote was to be taken, the leader of the majority faction of the Board
was quoted as being subjected to "intense pressure." New Haven Register, Sept. 9, 1940,
p. 1, col. 2. Pressure against the proposed action wvas exerted by the civic association,
which claimed 1,000 members [Register, June 12, 1940, p. 20, col. 4], and pressure for
enactment, by the New Haven Central Labor Council. The final meeting itself, which
resulted in a vote to close the streets, involved "one of the most acrid and bitter debates
in many years." Journal-Courier, Sept. 10, 1940, p. 1, col. 1; Register, Sept. 10, 1940,
p. 4, col. 3. Representative of the minority faction was the Alderman who contended
that "this board and this board alone has the right to close streets, and we cannot dele-
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that changing conditions will bring renewed protest and the opportunity for
pressure groups to bring about a change of council personnel are both in-
creased by the length of time during which housing projects will remain in
operation. Consequently, if the contracts are not held to be specifically en-
forceable on the basis of existing municipal corporations law, even slight
success of the present program seems unlikely.
gate this authority to anyone, the city housing board included. Are we going to make a
show of the charter and ordinances?" Ibid.
